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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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CONSEQUENCES OF U.S., USSR STRATEGIC EVOLUTION VIEWED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Jul 79 pp 43-70

[Report on paper presented by Denis Delbourg at DEFENSE NATIONALE symposium on 15 March 1979: "Strategic Evolution of the Two Great Powers and the Consequences for European Interests"; place of symposium not given]

[Text] Soviet-American SALT II negotiations have reached their conclusion and it is probable that by the time this issue appears in print Mr Brezhnev and Mr Carter will have signed the SALT II agreements.

We thought it of interest at this time to present to our readers the substance of a symposium we organized on 15 March, specifically on the topic of the strategic evolution of the two great powers as viewed against the backdrop of SALT.

The article which follows is the updated version of the enlightening paper read at that symposium by Mr Denis Delbourg. Below it, under the heading of "Commentaries," we present the substance of the discussions to which it gave rise.

Mr Denis Delbourg, a graduate of the Advanced College of Education and of the National College of Administration, is a faculty professor of philosophy.

The period of East-West crises which have kept the entire world in a state of suspense has ended. Today, the fear of civil nuclear energy is more vivid than the anguish over the possibility of atomic war. For the USSR, fear of China has relativized its fear of the West.

Nevertheless, the question of the strategic balance between the two great powers remains one of the important topics of the day.

For the United States and the USSR, it is a matter at one and the same time of sustaining an increasingly sophisticated competition, pursuing further SALT negotiations, and controlling the effects of the strategic balance on a relationship based on a global rivalry, which is itself being transformed by the worldwide trend toward multipolarity.

For the allies of the two great powers, it is a matter of evaluating for themselves, as France did, the consequences of their incorporation into a strategic sphere whose governing relationships they did not forge.¹

We will try here to bring out some of the keys to the situation that now presents itself, by evoking the strategic doctrines of the two great powers, their armament programs, and the nature of the "balance" they are seeking to achieve, particularly through the SALT series.

What, first of all, are the strategic doctrines that determine the choice of armament programs and inspire the behavior of the two powers as well as the signals of all kinds that they exchange?

The concept that cognizance must be taken of the changes brought about by atomic weapons, and rules of the game forged that would endow the threat of their use with a credible policy, made its first appearance in the United States.

Theoretically speaking, one constant has been identifiable from the start. The evolution of U.S. strategic doctrine has invariably been based on the need to reconcile two essentials which must complement each other for deterrent effectiveness but which the adversary, by way of counterstrategy, has consistently sought to contrapose, one against the other:

--brandishment of the threat of unacceptable retaliation against a potential aggressor, and

--warning of credible action in case of failure to deter.

As Soviet nuclear armament became more powerful, the basis of deterrence--unacceptableness--became reciprocally applicable, and the transformation of their peoples into mutual hostages rendered the consequences of a conflict equally intolerable to both the adversaries.

For this shared risk to adequately and reciprocally fulfill its deterrent function, it became necessary then that the threatened reprisals remain credible; that is, commensurate with the nature of the aggression (so that the doctrine preserved the possibility of halting the conflict before the holocaust) and sufficiently severe to confirm the probability of intolerableness (intra-war deterrence).²

"Flexibility," "limitation of damage," "counterforce options"; in a word, escalation: such is the concept designed to resolve this underlying antimony. However, practical deterrence can never escape the inherent instability that stems from this antimony, whose recurrent effects make themselves felt at every stage in the doctrinal evolutionary process.

The massive retaliation doctrine, linked with the names of Eisenhower and Foster Dulles, was initially effective: U.S. strategic superiority, in the cold war context, validated a repressive form of deterrence, a single blanket threat being adequate to forestall any attempt by the USSR to obtain unilateral advantages (even though Foster Dulles shaded this principle from the very beginning).

MacNamara's "flexible response," in its turn, drew on the lessons of historic evolution: after perfection of the thermonuclear bomb and the discovery by the United States of a new vulnerability that was given exaggerated importance by the "missile gap" theoreticians³, it became necessary to supplement the "all-or-nothing" doctrine with other options and to gear it to escalation.

But MacNamara in no way disavowed the concept of deterrence, and he defined assured destruction capability as "the ability to inflict at all times and under all foreseeable conditions a degree of damage unacceptable to a single aggressor or a combination of aggressors--even after having been hit by a surprise attack."

Reciprocal deterrence was thus able to take the form of the "assured mutual destruction" doctrine, deemed the most stable strategic relation. This gave rise to a theory of balance condemning "destabilizing" developments (those that might enable one party to avoid destruction in case of conflict either by protecting its population or disarming its adversary).

"Flexible response" in the form given it by Schlesinger enhanced the options available to the president of the United States for retaliatory action. Particularly, provisions for assigning counterforce missions to central systems, within a selective response network, resolved in a manner favorable to European interests the problem of articulation among the tactical nuclear forces, theater nuclear forces and strategic forces.

Carter adopted the essence of the doctrine that had been worked out by his predecessors and publicly affirmed on several occasions the doctrine of assured mutual destruction.⁴ It was based on this doctrine that Carter, wanting to reassure his compatriots regarding the current strategic balance, declared in his State of the Union address on 23 January:

"Each one of our Poseidon submarines, which are almost invulnerable--or, less than 2 percent of our combined submarine, air and land-based nuclear forces--carries enough nuclear warheads to destroy every major and medium-sized Soviet city."

But this doctrinal stance alone does not suffice to account for the current strategic debate.

It is to the words of Defense Secretary Harold Brown and to his departmental budget that certain U.S. commentators turn when they refer to some of the principal characteristics of his program:

--improvements in the present land-based component "will provide Minuteman III with greater capabilities--assuredly modest--for destroying hardened targets." With all the more reason, the MX program will provide Minuteman with a successor better suited to counterforce missions;

--recognition of the need for a capability to limit damage (inflicted as well as received): the reliability, the electronics, the effectiveness and the survivability of control, command and communications occupy privileged positions;

--special attention is accorded to theater nuclear forces.

Do these inflexions signify that the U.S. Government is preparing to change its strategy?⁵ Mr Brown has unquestionably said: "It is easily understandable that U.S. presidents have never been satisfied with having but one alternative at their disposal, that of certain destruction which would be catastrophic."

But Schlesinger had in fact already said 5 years earlier: "The president of the United States, in case of a small-scale Soviet attack directed solely on military objectives, cannot under present conditions but order a response against the USSR's urban and industrial centers. The president would hesitate to issue such an order, the more so since it would provoke a generalized USSR counterblow (...). It is therefore necessary that the president be in a position to order an attack on enemy military objectives."

It seems therefore that Mr Brown is doing no more than bringing out the implications of a strategic doctrine roughcast well before his time. The United States' development of a "war fighting nuclear technology"⁶ is as much the natural outcome of the demand for "flexibility" as it is inherent in the dynamics of technological innovation itself.

Mr Brown's recent statements⁷ clarify this debate: "Strategic forces planning is based on two concepts: deterrence and essential equivalence" (...).

"Our basic strategy demands that we be capable of inflicting on our potential adversaries such damage that, whatever the circumstances, the prospect will deter them from attacking the United States, our allies, or our vital interests. To achieve this condition, we need first of all a survivable capability enabling us to devastate the USSR's industry and cities. This assured destructive capability, which is what I have just defined, is the basis of nuclear deterrence. It is however, in my opinion, not complete in itself as a strategic doctrine (...). A fully effective deterrent capability demands forces of sufficient size and flexibility to attack selectively a range of military or other types of targets, and to permit us to maintain a significant reserve. This ability to respond to limited attacks with commensurate retaliation, and to prevent the Soviets from imagining they can derive a significant advantage at some level in a nuclear conflict, is essential to a credible deterrence."

The U.S. doctrine has thus been enhanced by elaboration of the deterrent concept itself, by assimilation of technological innovations, by responses to Soviet advancements, but also by adaptation to the internal evolution of the alliance. These are all differing requirements whose continued reconciliation is a gamble.

How do matters stand on the Soviet side? We will not here go into a detailed discussion of the controversies over the exact direction in which Soviet strategy is leading. We will simply try, on the basis of purely abstract assumptions as to the "intent" of the Soviet leadership, to sift out the nature of the "dissymmetry" being recognized by the majority of observers⁸ between the strategic thinking of the Americans and that of the Soviets, without regard for the "pragmatic collusion" generated by common interests and embodied in detente.

We assume that in the view of the Soviet strategists, nuclear armament is an instrument of war, that it must be considered in terms of its being used, and that the entire Soviet structure must be articulated to enable "total victory" in a nuclear conflict. In this hypothesis, the USSR would therefore reject the Western concept of deterrence.

In contraposition to this assumption, however, we add that the civilian leadership since Krushchev has, for its part, moved away from the Stalin concept that atomic weapons have brought no change in the historic simplification of war, and that the current Soviet attitude toward the SALT negotiations evidences an implicit recognition of the notion of deterrence.

Nevertheless, an examination of documented material appears to negate this contradiction, in that Soviet nuclear strategy is clearly based on three underlying principles:

1. The statements of Soviet leaders, with very rare exceptions, agree on one point: nuclear war can only be total, its escalation to extremes being inevitable. The Western notion of limited nuclear conflict is illusory.

This insistence on the inevitable nature of the holocaust enables the Soviet leaders to affirm the need to avoid all confrontations, a reminder that serves in place of a doctrine of mutual deterrence.

2. In the event of nuclear war, the USSR must renounce neither survival nor victory. Hence, the choices frequently emphasized: preparation for combat in a nuclear environment, ability to destroy hardened targets (priority to missile power), hardening of communications, efforts to limit damage, civil defense, etc.

3. The USSR deters the adversary by building up its nuclear war-making capability while asserting its chances of survival and of winning. It is the USSR that applies rigorously the pre-atomic adage of deterrence based on fear of violence (rather than on the certainty of destruction): If you seek peace, prepare for war.

If we compare the two philosophies, the American and the Soviet, we can define as follows the dissymmetry that differentiates their concepts of nuclear balance: for the Americans, strategic parity means equality in the certainty of losing; for the Soviets, it means equality in the hope of surviving.

There is, however, a domain where the two strategies must meet and partially reveal themselves to each other in a reciprocal, contractual commitment: the SALT negotiations.

We will not dwell on the history and accomplishments of these negotiations, which have so often been analyzed. To draw a meaningful conclusion, we need only compare, on the one hand, the timetable of the SALT process--start of negotiations in 1969, the ABM [Antiballistic Missiles] agreements and interim unequal-ceilings agreement of 1972, the Vladivostok equal-ceilings agreement in 1974, the hiatus until President Carter's arrival, the latter's maximalist thrusts in 1977, then a return to a small-steps policy--with, on the other hand, the chronology of the "armaments race"--starting in 1969, with the USSR passing the United States in number of ICBM's [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles], developing a new family of high payload-carrying ICBM's after SALT I and reaching, in 1975, the ceiling agreed on in 1972; continuing after 1974 with the MIRV [Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle] and the total-of-warheads races, as the USSR overtook the United States in number of SLEM's [Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles]; then, the United States limiting its quantitative ceiling after 1967 but launching the first Poseidon submarine equipped with MIRV's in 1971, thus achieving a qualitative advantage and supremacy in number of warheads, etc.

One can, at this point, draw some conclusions as to the real nature of SALT: less a joint renunciation of certain armaments (except for the ABM agreement) than balanced limitations permitting each of the two parties to pursue the programs it considers strategically the most effective; less a halting of the arms race, in accordance with the obligations of the 1968 Nuclear Proliferation Agreement, than a transfer to other racetracks, mainly in the qualitative domain: less a seeking of a stabilized state of deterrence by acting to prevent the development of a first-strike capability than a concession to the prevention of conflicts by exchanging assurances on weapons performance; less the main highway of detente and mutual comprehension than the privileged byway of U.S.-Soviet dialogue.

Currently, according to press reports, the SALT II draft agreement is in three parts: a treaty valid until some time in 1985, a protocol expiring on 31 December 1981, and a statement of principles for SALT III. This three-part structure in itself, with its overlapping timeframes, illustrates the difficulties of the negotiations.

We will briefly recapitulate here the agreement's main points and try to rapidly sift out their significance and their consequences, taking into account the armaments programs of the two powers.

The treaty provisions include:

--an equal aggregate limit of 2,250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which will require the USSR to dismantle 200 such vehicles between now and 1982, while the United States finds itself 100 vehicles short of this limit;

--an equal aggregate limit of 1,320 MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with long range cruise missiles, which could limit the Americans to 120 B-52's modified to carry cruise missiles, considering its number of MIRVed missiles;

--a limit of 1,200 on the number of MIRVed ballistic missiles, which would not affect the United States until its seventh Trident submarine is placed in service, but which should place a limitation on the accelerated MIRVing of Soviet missiles (currently, around 400 Soviet MIRVed missiles);

--a limit of 820 on ground-launched ICBM's, which should also affect Soviet replacement of ICBM's beginning in 1982. This is the first time this category of vehicles has been the object of a special limitation;

--a ban on construction of additional ground-to-ground "heavy" missiles, which amounts to a freeze at the current levels of these missiles, of which the USSR has 308 and the United States none;

--limitations on the deployment of new types of missiles (only one type of ICBM could be tested and deployed during the term of the treaty, the number of warheads being limited for different categories of missiles), which permit some key programs (particularly the MX)⁹, but could retard the Soviet fifth generation;

--a non-circumvention clause that apparently responds to the Soviet desire to limit the transfers the United States facilitates to its allies.

The protocol (which is due to expire on 31 December 1981) includes the following provisions:

--a ban on deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and on flight testing of ICBM's launched by such launchers, which should not affect the United States to the extent that the MX is not due to be tested before 1982; for the USSR this clause bans the deployment of its mobile version of the SS 16, which has already been tested;

--a ban on the deployment of cruise missiles launched from ground or maritime platforms and having a range greater than 600 km, affecting the 1,000-mile cruise missiles that could otherwise equip NATO. It does not affect the USSR. This clause limiting a weapons system of interest to the European theater, without a Soviet quid pro quo, has been a prime factor in the rising tide of European misgivings on SALT.

The statement of SALT III principles includes:

--a wish to substantially reduce aggregate levels, which is intended to reflect the intent of the parties to pursue the process of quantitative limitations;

--a commitment to seek solutions, on a priority basis, to the issues temporarily settled by the protocol, that seems to perpetuate the current dynamics of the negotiations although the United States maintains it can change this if need be;

--a proposed formula that would take into account all factors determining the strategic situation, and that responds to Soviet pressures regarding the so-called gray-zone armaments, starting with the FBS [Forward Based Systems]¹⁰, which the USSR has persistently demanded be included in the accounting. To set forth its position on this formula, the United States would issue a separate statement asserting that "all future limitations on American systems dedicated principally to theater operations must be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems."

This brief analysis of the different clauses contained in the draft SALT II agreement clearly discloses that the latter would represent little more than a compromise and would not bring about any profound change in the terms of the strategic equation. Why, then, is SALT II the focus of such heated controversy on the American political scene? To better understand it, let us examine the key points in the debate between the agreement's supporters and its opponents:¹¹

The supporters of SALT argue:

--the following limiting aspects of SALT II:

1. It achieves a lowering of ceilings which for the first time will commit the Soviet Union to an actual dismantlement.
2. It constitutes an endeavor to better limit the types of nuclear warhead delivery vehicles considered the most dangerous to the reliability of deterrence (MIRVed ICBM's and heavy ICBM's). True, the Soviet Union is not prevented from increasing its power in these sensitive categories, but it will not go as far as it could.
3. It constitutes a first step in the direction of regulating qualitative competition in that technological improvements, while not being, strictly speaking, halted, are beginning to be subjected to agreement. Innovation is being circumscribed not as a process in itself but as regards its fields of application.

--its following permissive aspects:

SALT II supporters overlook no opportunity to emphasize that the agreement raises no obstacles to the pursuit of indispensable U.S. strategic programs.

It is only fair to add that the two parties to the agreement have, through its provisions relative to exceptions and to the finalizing of the schedule of limitations, actually reached an understanding enabling them to continue their respective essential strategic choices.

--and its following significance:

SALT confirms a lowering of the risk of nuclear war but by its nature it cannot achieve a codification of strategic parity.

Opponents of the agreement advance three basic arguments:

1. The exceedingly high SALT ceilings compromise American security by authorizing an enhancement of the Soviet war-making capability. SALT II in particular fails to place any obstacle whatever in the way of development by the mid-1980's of a Soviet first-strike capability against American ICBM silos. In 1985, according to Mr Paul Nitze¹², the aggregate useful payload of the American MIRVed ICBM force will not exceed 1.25 million pounds with 1,650 reentry vehicles, whereas the USSR will have (with its SS 18, SS 17 and 19) between 8 and 9 million pounds, 6,000 reentry vehicles, and hence the capability to destroy 70-90 percent of American silos.
2. SALT contains unilateral American concessions (the protocol is especially being criticized in this regard).
3. The USSR continues to stress defensive means (ground-to-air missiles, aviation, early warning radars, civil defense, fixed installations) while SALT creates the illusion of security disregarding the real nature of the Soviet strategy.

What does this debate boil down to? The dialog between the opponents and the defenders of SALT can to some extent be summarized as a conflict between two viewpoints on SALT.¹³ According to the first of these, SALT agreements are more harmful than useful if they do not contribute directly to relieving the United States' strategic vulnerability. According to the second, SALT agreements are in no way a substitute for a national security policy; they can only complement it.

If it is true that SALT proceedings are currently making it possible to limit and channel strategic competition and to diminish the risk of armed conflict, it is also true that these effects are being achieved less through a commitment to a stabilized mutual deterrence (an objective that is being sought through choice of weapons) than through an exchange of information that operates to narrow down the uncertainties in the strategic calculations of the two parties.

Those are the specific objectives expressed by Brzezinski on 4 April 1979:¹⁴ "The USSR has recognized that SALT agreements are helpful in containing the nuclear risk that would result from unbridled competition in strategic armaments." The SALT process helps defuse the competition by reducing the uncertainty of the threat each faces. Besides, it allows the United States the "flexibility" it needs to resolve the ICBM problem.

Beyond this debate, can we try to evaluate the reality of the strategic balance?¹⁵

The United States currently has 1,045 ICBM's 560 of which are triple-warhead Minuteman III's; 656 SLBM's about 500 of which are MIRVed; and 349 piloted heavy bombers. It has a total of 1,046 MIRVed missiles. More than 10,000 warheads are available to equip these nuclear delivery vehicles, 2,154 of which are designed for the ICBM's.

The USSR has 2,565 nuclear delivery vehicles, of which 1,480 are ICBM's (300 of these MIRVed), 950 are SLBM's, and 135 are heavy bombers. Close to 5,000 warheads are available to equip these nuclear delivery vehicles, more than 3,000 of which are designed for the ICBM's.

In the absence of the SALT II agreements, American experts¹⁶ estimate the USSR would have, by 1985, 3,000 missiles, 1,900 of them MIRVed. During the same period, the United States would not augment its above-described arsenal if it adhered to its currently approved programs.

Under the SALT II agreement, the USSR could not deploy its potential beyond the equal ceilings, but it could increase its 350 MIRVed ICBM's to 820 and by 1982, as we have seen, overcome the American lead in number of warheads.

What then will be the new strategic equation? It will depend on the programs carried out by one side and the other, and especially, on the American side, those of the Trident submarine and the MX missile, enhanced by significant qualitative improvements. Suffice it to recall that the MAP [Multiple Aim Point] system could relieve the ICBM's of the vulnerability incurred by the Minuteman III.¹⁷

In view of these considerations, entirely static though they be, can essential equivalence still be considered very much an issue? If strategic balance consists primarily of the absence, on both sides, of a serious temptation to attack, has it not been achieved? Can one seriously believe in the term "global throw of the dice" used by Harold Brown for a possible Soviet preemptive strike?

And yet the central problem of the ICBM's vulnerability suffices to give rise to a perception of "dissymmetry." Henry Kissinger, in his article in the ECONOMIST of 3 February 1979, sets forth the reasons: "Faced by a USSR equipped with counterforce capabilities, the United States, after losing its ICBM's, could count on nothing more than the threat of retaliation against urban centers, which is no longer a credible political option

in today's world. Kissinger therefore proposes revising the concept of balance which he himself had advocated under SALT I, and equipping the United States as soon as possible with counterforce capabilities assured by nuclear delivery vehicles non-vulnerable to a first strike. He adds that without these capabilities, "thus having freed the USSR of the fear of a counterforce strike, one might seriously ask what would happen if, besides having no counterforce capabilities, we are in a clearly inferior position as regards means of local intervention and our political system creates the impression abroad that our inhibitions as regards local interventions are tending to become stronger. This would present grave problems for all the free peoples."

These then, in the final analysis, are the geopolitical stakes in the game of strategic balance: aside from the prevention of nuclear conflicts through essential equivalence, the behavior of the superpowers in a crisis is determined by the self-confidence they draw from their nuclear forces.

This is precisely the argument President Carter used inversely in his February speech in Atlanta: to reject SALT would be to render each crisis, each confrontation more dangerous, because it would take place "in an atmosphere of unbridled strategic competition and of deterioration in the strategic stability."

This brings us to the limits of our analysis: Strategy proposes, policy disposes. The perspective for strategic planning is provided by a relationship of forces based on policy (and determined entirely by factors other than war games). We must bear this consideration in mind as we try to evaluate the Soviet-American balance.

How do the United States' European allies view the situation we have just described and its implications as regards their own security? There is no single answer to this question. Political and geostrategic considerations, individual to each of the allies, lead to different interpretations rendered the more uncertain by internal controversies.

But though the answers are many, the issue compellingly posed by the strategic evaluation is well defined: it is that of the growing Western vulnerability.

In his November 1977 speech to the London Institute of Strategic Studies, which passed the word to the "gray zone" initiates, Chancellor Schmidt defined the issue in these terms: The strategic parity laid down by SALT results in neutralization of central systems. European security can therefore not be assured unless the European theater's nuclear arms also obey the parity principle. The current imbalance in this domain favors the USSR.

In the 18 months following these statements, the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] has communicated its concerns to its allies and diligently explored the strategic implications of the chancellor's reasoning. Recognizing that

parity based on aggregate levels necessarily implied "decoupling,"¹⁸ the thinking of the specialists turned towards the notion of a general nuclear equation that would assign strategic values to weapons systems of direct interest to the European theater.

Taking into account its policy lines that must be reconciled (allegiance to the Atlantic Pact and pursuit of Ostpolitik, through arms control if necessary) the FRG Government's current position appears now to be approaching a minimalist application of the "integrated strategy" conceived by Washington: a military response to European vulnerability through the modernization of theater weapons systems, which comes under the normal responsibility of the integrated organization and excludes any FRG status change in its defense "posture" toward Moscow; as to the possibilities of arms control (SALT III), these must not be wasted, be they solely those of righting the unilateral character of the concessions already made by the West on theater arms.

What then is the nature of the claimed imbalance in the domain of the so-called "Eurostrategic" arms?¹⁹

Confining ourselves to the basic systems, it will be recalled that although the USSR currently has at its disposal around 500 SS 4 and SS 5 medium-range ballistic missiles threatening Western Europe, it is currently developing the SS 20 missile: mobile, increased range, equipped with three warheads, and more accurate than its predecessors. In the domain of medium-unrefueled-range bombers, the USSR is currently producing the Backfire, finally not included in the draft SALT agreement.

NATO faces this arsenal with carrier-based F 111 and F 4 (Forward Based Systems) bombers. It can also count on those Poseidon missiles assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); however, the latter are included in SALT as central systems.

Evaluation of strategic innovations introduced by Soviet deployments depends on the doctrinal terms of reference employed.

Placing ourselves in the position of NATO, we can, in an intentionally artificial way, differentiate three analytical viewpoints (which take their sense only from the manner in which one chooses to articulate them):

From the "military" viewpoint, the performance characteristics of the SS 20 signify:

- the possibility of "processing," with precision, the majority of the NATO military and logistic objectives located on European soil, with if not insignificant, at least reduced collateral damages; it would, however, be exaggerated to deduce the possibility of an antiferces surgical strike disarming the Western forces without civilian victims;

- the possibility that the [Soviet] missiles retained in reserve after a first [Soviet] strike can escape a retaliatory antiferces strike by NATO (assuming the means for it exist).

From the "strategic" viewpoint, these performance characteristics must be assessed against the NATO doctrine of graduated response, which articulates the conventional forces, the theater nuclear forces and the strategic forces within an escalation framework whose fundamental nuclear stages are "selective nuclear response" and "general nuclear response." The SS 20 presents a challenge to this doctrine to the extent the latter assumes the United States will maintain escalation control. This assumption overlies a simple requirement: that at no stage in the escalation will the president of the United States have to brandish the threat of retaliation incommensurate with the attack suffered. Now the United States, after an SS 20 antiforces strike, could not, with the means currently at its disposal, respond with a retaliatory strike at the USSR reserve nuclear and military potentials without resorting to its central systems. True, by virtue of the Schlesinger doctrine, certain of the Poseidon submarines are assigned to such selective strikes, even though their precision is less than that of land-based systems. But for symbolic reasons this alternative is not sufficient to restore confidence.

From a "policy" viewpoint, the problem that is posed is that of translating the virtual dissymmetry identified at the strategic level into a forces relationship.

True, the Soviet "advantage" is an uncertainty: American strategic retaliation remains at all events a risk which the USSR leadership cannot disregard. Europe derives a certain guaranty of security from the common interest of the superpowers in avoiding a nuclear conflict in view of essential equivalence. The "conquest" of Western Europe through nuclear means does not appear to be a rational objective.

The policy problem is another: In the context of an American commitment to European defense, affected by a coefficient of uncertainty, the strategic conclusions we have drawn, highly theoretical though they be, translate into a practical European concern: avoiding, in the Soviet perception, a loss of credibility in the American commitment after its yielding to a dissymmetry of means and a challenge to the American doctrine.

The mere semblance of a dissymmetry raises the risk of affecting the behavior of the participants in the case of a crisis. Now Europe lives obsessed by the notion of a crisis in perpetual deferment--an obsession that can enable the USSR to obtain political concessions from the Europeans based on its military power.

Whatever may be the relevance of this problem, these European misgivings call for appropriate policy treatment. This treatment must be based on restoration of confidence from the strategic viewpoint. True, the question of which military deployments (or which arms control formulas) can strengthen or weaken "coupling" can hardly be answered from a theoretical standpoint with any degree of certainty. But the idea of the Western side having available one or more systems stationed in Europe (Pershing II XR, cruise missiles) and capable of delivering selective retaliation on Soviet soil has been addressed by NATO.

We can but note here the parallelism between the vulnerability of American ground-to-ground missiles and that of the NATO ground installations; and even more, the parallelism between the military responses advocated by some experts in the two cases: the same requirement in both cases for an assured selective retaliatory strike retaining antiforces options.²⁰

Consensus, however, is far from being achieved on providing for such response. The restoration of confidence can also be sought through negotiation.

Certain SALT II clauses, as we have seen, have in fact raised the issue, on the part of the Western side, of European theater-based nuclear arms.

In the second place, the inclusion in SALT III of at least some of these arms appears to be agreed on principle. This treatment of the issue seems to have satisfied the negotiators (cf. Statement of Principles of SALT III)--as much those who seek to obtain through negotiation a limitation of Soviet medium-range power as those who see in it a necessary perpetuation of detente.

The risks inherent in the inclusion of the gray zone in SALT III have not escaped the specialists:

- a semblance of decoupling;

- a weak NATO negotiating position without quid pro quo to offer;

- a supplementary complication added to the arms control process which itself needs to be reconsidered;

- the strategic advantage that the USSR could derive from the gradual elimination, through expansion of the SALT terms of reference (and perhaps multilateralization of the talks), of the complication presented by the European defense posture, which is in itself a deterrent component.

The British and French national nuclear forces in particular, as was recognized by the Ottawa declaration, contribute to the alliance's global deterrence by introducing a specific risk for the potential aggressor. Clearly, they do not contribute by adding a few nuclear delivery vehicles to those of the American forces, with which the British and French forces cannot be compared. Their contribution is significant only to the extent they come under an independent decision center.

This brings us finally to the question of the French attitude toward these evolutions which we have gone into as descriptively as possible up to this point.

To begin with, it must be recalled that within the terms of reference of the French deterrence doctrine, the problem of the "gray zone" does not represent a new challenge, but rather a factor in the strategic environment that must be taken into account under the program of modernization and renovation of our nuclear forces.

The French assessment of SALT has been known for a long time: Favorable to any steps toward nuclear disarmament, France salutes the progress of SALT but notes that the superpowers are still a long way from reducing their superabundant arsenals to the minimum requisite levels for a mutual and stable deterrence. Thus, the insertion, into current negotiations, of our own nuclear forces, which respond solely to minimum deterrent requirements, would be counterproductive.

The 10 January communique of the Council of Ministers, following the Guadeloupe summit, confirmed the French refusal to participate in SALT III. As the president of the republic had done in his 15 February 1979 press conference, Mr Francois-Poncet, in a speech on 3 May 1979 before the National Assembly, recalled "that the eventuality of France joining in such negotiations has been discarded. It must not be forgotten that France's nuclear forces actually constitute for her the "central system" that guarantees her vital interests against any aggression. They could not, therefore, be permitted to be absorbed into the medium-range armaments of the major powers." True, France cannot disregard the question-marks that trouble her close allies.²¹ Such an attitude would be incompatible with the initiatives she has taken to strengthen the security of Europe.

But she cannot fail to see in the current strategic situation a confirmation of the relevance of the analyses that led her to adopt an independent defense policy.²²

I should like to end now, by way of a brief conclusion, with a look into the future.

In the Western view, the sense of strategic vulnerability takes a very distinct form: an obsession with circumvention.

This obsession was at the origin itself of the American escalation strategy: Deterrence was to be capable of responding to threats other than those which unambiguously point toward violations of sanctuary.

Today, two means of circumvention are generating more fear than ever. The first is by way of technology: the threat of selective destruction. The second is by way of geostrategy: the possibility of a limited conflict in Europe.

If this twofold fear is allowed to spread, without applying any remedy beyond technological one-upmanship and sophistication of the alliance's doctrine, deterrence may very well enter the realm of sclerosed dogma and its contribution to the stability of international relations become obscured.

In view of such an outlook, a point of anchorage: an independent defense policy. But also an imperative for survival: a disarmament process that is more than a mere registration procedure and that is dedicated to breaking the cycle of strategic circumvention--the modern version of sword and shield warfare.

Commentaries

The [above] paper read by Mr Denis Delbourg at our 15 March symposium gave rise to a number of questions and comments from his audience. Our readers are requested to pardon our not publishing them here in full. We will limit ourselves instead to summaries of the two most typical commentaries, those of Generals Gallois and Valentin. To these we will add the contribution of Mr W. Schutze, of the French International Relations Institute, inasmuch as his remarks represent the German viewpoint, and finally the remarks offered by Gen Francois Maurin by way of conclusion.

According to General Gallois:

American arguments in regard to the vulnerability of its Titan and Minuteman ICBM's and the "all-or-nothing" alternative to which the president of the United States would be driven in the event of a first antiferces strike are fallacious. They are aimed mainly at providing a justification for the development of the MX mobile missile.

Assuming that the Soviets were in fact to take the dreadful decision to attack by surprise--an indispensable condition to the success of such an operation--the United States' fixed strategic weapons installations, gambling on the American intent to not use their submarine-launched nuclear weapons against the Soviet homeland, they could actually destroy virtually every land-based missile in the United States. But they would then have emptied virtually every one of their own silos, and it is hard to see any interest on the part of the Americans in firing on empty silos...

However, the destruction of 550 American Minuteman missiles, each having been attacked by two nuclear weapons of which one is percussion-fired, would release huge clouds of radioactive dust which, according to studies that have been carried out, would result in the loss of 6-10 million human lives.

Who can believe that in such case the Americans would hesitate to use their submarine-launched missiles even if they are less accurate (according to General Gallois, the margin of error of a silo-launched ICBM would be 200 meters and that of an SLEM launched by a missile-launching nuclear submarine would be 800 meters) and if, moreover, population centers and economic assets are their targets more so than strategic weapons? And who can believe that the Soviets would dare take the formidable risk of gambling on the United States exercising self-constraint in such a case?

As regards the retention of a reserve of accurate missiles to destroy, without collateral damage, the United States' military buildings and arms depots, this would have no interest whatever for the Soviets since it would change nothing in the situation in which the two powers would find themselves. The American silos having been destroyed and the Soviet silos emptied, the alternative remaining to the two adversaries would be to hold each other's economic assets and habitat hostages.

However, the same line of reasoning must not be transposed to a nuclear attack on military objectives in Europe. Here, still according to General Gallois, it would actually be possible for an enemy, equipped with an accurate nuclear delivery vehicle like the SS 20 and undertaking a first strike, to carry out selective surprise strikes--"scalpel strokes" ("surgical strikes" as they are called by the Americans) without significant collateral damage. Major conventional armaments could thus be virtually all destroyed; planes stationed at airdromes, for example, would be eliminated by high-level explosions without radioactive fallout and even without neighboring population centers being alerted to what was happening. The same holds true for installations (equipment and munitions depots, general headquarters) located outside of urban centers. This in any case is the capability the Soviets are acquiring by equipping themselves, if the plans attributed to them are to be believed, with 1,200 SS 20s MIRVed with 3,600 nuclear warheads.

In General Gallois' view, therefore, there can be no doubt: It is in the interest of "the potential enemy," if he decides to resort to force--an eventuality the current probability of which appears to General Gallois to be very small*--to play all of his nuclear trumps at one time and by surprise.

General Valentin's Views

The former commander of the French First Army, who then took the floor, opened with the remark: It is difficult to speak with assurance of a Soviet "doctrine" on the employment of nuclear weapons. Their concepts in this domain appear to be too flexible and too evolutionary to be able to attribute to them a plan to use their nuclear armament all in one strike, or a plan to carry out a conventional action of short duration, or even a plan to not be the first to unleash a nuclear war.

At the end of the 1950-1960 decade, the Soviets did in fact center their thinking on the use of atomic weapons and tank's offensive action. Towards 1965 their emphasis shifted to the concept that a European war could begin with a conventional phase of definite duration, and hence to a combined mechanized infantry-motorized artillery component. More recently, "precision guided weapons" have moved them to thinking in terms of a slowdown in the rhythm of the offensive and a recourse to tactical atomic weapons in case the conventional phase were to end in a standoff.

The so-called Soviet doctrine, at least as some observers claim to define it, is a sort of "Spanish inn," where one consumes only what one brings into it. True, the Soviets always appear to turn much more toward considerations of actual usage than do the Westerners, but one of the reasons behind this difference is that the Soviet military writers are generals, oriented

*For more on this topic cf. the text of his message to the International Diplomatic Academy on 4 April 1979, which is published in this issue under the title "The New Weapons and the Security of the Western European Countries."

toward action, and concerned with the training of their forces, whereas in the West the writers are for the most part philosophers, politicians, or military men more taken up with rhetoric and dialect than with the conduct of military operations.

General Valentin's second comment addressed the possibility of a Soviet recourse to a war in Europe. He agreed with General Gallois that the probability is very remote. However, he holds an entirely different view as to the form a Soviet strategic offensive would be likely to take. In his view, the most likely hypothesis would be that of an initial attack by conventional means, whereby the enemy would expect his superiority in tanks and combat aircraft to enable him to rapidly attain his objectives while the West dared not be the first to resort to nuclear arms. The enemy, however, would be nonetheless prepared to fall back on nuclear action if necessary.

General Gallois maintained that this strategic conception would be disadvantageous to the aggressor: He would lose the benefit of surprise because he would be compelled to mobilize large air and ground forces, which would give the West time for consultations and the Americans time to send reinforcements by air. He would thus become involved in a war of attrition whereas he could rapidly have attained his ends by a nuclear blitzkrieg. He would destroy what it is believed he would want to conquer. In fact, conventional combat with thousands of tanks and cannons concentrated in the urban zones, which today constitute the most natural strongpoints, would be disastrous to the West European habitat.

The enemy would, on the contrary, find it all to his advantage to eliminate by a single stroke, by surprise, and cleanly, the alliance's military force, its nuclear means, and its conventional means, mainly the German units, without involving the American units and without losing a soldier... He could then propose to negotiate with the United States to the detriment of the disarmed Europeans, and the United States would be all the more inclined to accept in that it would practically have had no losses.

General Gallois admitted that this was not the only possible scenario, but maintained that it is nevertheless the most advantageous for a potential enemy, assuming of course that he has decided to resort to war.

General Valentin retorted that in advancing the hypothesis of conventional combat he was not suggesting that the Soviets must engage in a war of attrition, and much less was he evoking the concern that a discerning enemy should have for not destroying what he wished to conquer.

He pointed out that all these lines of reasoning must be evaluated in terms of probabilities and that while General Gallois' hypothesis did not appear to him impossible, it did seem to him very improbable. The FRG population density, the overlapping of command posts, unit barracks, depots, airdromes, and the habitat is such that an attack such as the one described by General

Gallois would, whether the enemy wanted it so or not, be an anti-urban center attack, and if it did not trigger escalation then all the assertions on which deterrence is based are but hot air. Imputing such a gamble to the enemy would be to take him for a madman.

Moreover, the accuracy of the SS 20, even if it has been improved, seems to him still very arguable, and it is still its power (3 each 0.3-1 megaton MIRV warheads) more than its accuracy which accounts for its effectiveness. As to the number of SS 20s planned (200-400), it is far from being realized as yet. Now the attack described by General Gallois would require at least 600-1,200 warheads. In sum, selective use of nuclear weapons brought to bear solely on allied targets and sparing of American forces appears to him at least a very difficult and above all hazardous operation.

In General Valentin's opinion, the notion of selective use of nuclear arms toward which General Gallois' theory appears to be evolving today cannot be finally realized except by arms of the "neutron bomb" type. It is not impossible that the Soviets may build them before the West does, but as long as reliance must be placed on the SS 20, and without wanting to minimize the danger it represents, the means for a strike that would disarm the allied forces without triggering escalation do not presently exist.

Mr Walter Schutze

Mr Walter Schutze is a German political science researcher with the French International Relations Institute.

He underscored the interest awakened in the FRG by the SALT negotiations and the indifference shown toward them by the other European countries except those which, like the FRG and being on the front line, rightly or wrongly consider themselves affected by any change in the strategic balance between the two great powers.

The debate that took place in the Bundestag on 8 and 9 March took an impassioned turn. Chancellor Smith and the majority parties defended positions identical to those of President Carter, favorable to the SALT agreement, while the opposition echoed the arguments of those hostile to it.

Going beyond an examination of details and questions--on the one hand, regarding the scope of the protocol attached to the treaty, banning the use of cruise missiles other than those covered by the agreement, and on the other hand, regarding the possibilities of technological transfers to the United States' allies--Christian Democratic circles appear no longer willing to accept that the arms control policy is the most appropriate means of stabilizing the forces relationship between the alliance's two systems. The fundamental question of whether to continue the policy of detente towards the Eastern countries has reappeared in the background of the intra-German debate on SALT. While the Federal Republic's Government and its coalition affirm that a rejection of the treaty by the American

Congress would have very serious consequences throughout the world and in Europe and could bring into question the entire policy of detente, the opposition underscores the Soviet Union's expansionist aims for which detente serves as a cover. However, Mr Schutze emphasized, according to opinion polls, less than a third of the German citizenry, and mainly those belonging to the generation familiar with the last war, believe in the reality of a military threat from the East.

As to the chances of maintaining a global balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, German opinions are also sharply divided, one view casting doubt on the credibility of the American commitment by the mid-1980's should the USSR further widen its lead, and the other view--especially the official one--insisting that it is precisely the possibility of a "Eurostrategic" imbalance which spurs the quest for a nuclear arms limitation agreement in the so-called gray zone. Mr Schmidt shares the latter view, expressed in his October 1977 speech in London, according to which arms parity must be established at all levels and SALT and MBFR must be completed by agreements concerning nuclear delivery vehicles with a continental range in the gray zone, that is, not a geographical zone in the true sense of the term but the entirety of nuclear arms systems capable of striking, on the one hand, Soviet territory, and on the other, all of Western Europe.

This position is rejected by the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) whose specialists demand that the compromised balance be first of all reestablished and that the European NATO countries be provided with the counterpart of the SS 20 missile--in brief, the adoption of a position of force against the USSR's continued rearmament and the subordination of arms control considerations to the imperatives of deterrence and defense.

Mr Schutze felt that the quarrel is in fact theoretical, in that the two major powers are already in agreement to continue the negotiating process by means of SALT III one of the objects of which is precisely to limit the so-called Eurostrategic arms. Mr Schutze said it will first be necessary to inventory the systems in existence--the American FBS and the French and British nuclear forces on the one hand, and the SS 20 and Backfire bombers on the other--with the aim of achieving an equivalence expressed in terms of numbers, instead of introducing new American nuclear delivery vehicles which, in any case, being incapable of destroying the SS 20 mobile ramps, cannot serve as a counterbalance to the latter.

In the Federal Republic Government's view, according to the speaker, the issue involves two distinct problems: on the one hand, the modernization, conforming to the program agreed at the May 1978 Atlantic summit in Washington, of the nuclear forces currently deployed in Europe; and on the other hand, the eventual deployment of new nuclear delivery vehicles with a range enabling them to strike Soviet territory. Clearly speaking, that would mean that in addition to the FBS currently based in England and those carried by the Mediterranean Sixth Fleet's aircraft carriers, similar weapons systems would be stationed on German soil. But this, besides posing the

technical problem of the vulnerability of these vehicles, brings into question again the distribution of missions tacitly agreed since NATO's inception, according to which the FRG cannot harbor armaments capable of directly striking the Soviet Union.

This also poses the question of sharing the risk incurred by the country if it stations ICBM's or Pershing 2's on its soil. The Federal Republic's government--Chancellor Schmidt and Defense Minister Hans Apel--refuse to accept for the FRG the "unique status" within the alliance that would result from the stationing on FRG territory alone of Eurostrategic weapons systems considered by the current opposition as contrary to their wishes.

General F. Maurin

The former chief of the Armed Forces General Staff provided a conclusion in these terms:

"This debate on the strategic evolution of the two major powers and the resulting implications for European interests, so ably introduced by Mr Delbourg and carried forward by the discussions among qualified experts, has, in my opinion, brought out the following facts:

--the harsh technological competition between the two major powers continues undiminished and threatens to one day considerably modify the military situation on which peace has rested; and

--their mutual destructive capability being assured, one would have expected a kind of reciprocal deterrence; yet the postures maintained by the two superpowers are so manifestly different as to make it clear they are not speaking the same language.

"The United States seeks that its president have at his disposal alternatives other than mass destruction. This is why it has invented, to use the NATO term, 'flexible response,' with the essential aim of deferring the start of nuclearization of a conflict.

"For the USSR, nuclear arms represent instruments of war and all the aspects of technical progress that it pursues are aimed at winning. This aim can now be achieved in various manners, given the new capabilities of its military power, as this debate has clearly brought out.

"Historically speaking, one can say that since the SALT I agreements, the Western position has deteriorated inasmuch as there have been added to an inferiority in conventional arms an agreed parity in strategic nuclear arms and a continuing modernization (SS 16-17-18) and diversification (SS 20) of the Soviet nuclear forces.

"The SALT II agreements, although advocating a lowering of ceilings below the levels that were anticipated by 1985, do not represent a joint effort towards disarmament inasmuch as they actually perpetuate the progressive implementation of the fundamental strategic choices of the two major powers.

"Arms control, the basic means for verifying respect of the agreements, is today being considered problematical, and this debate has shown that the military potentials authorized by the agreement permit the unfolding of a very large number of scenarios, including the preemptive destruction of the enemy's offensive potential. At the same time, though it is generally felt that reasons for starting an armed conflict do not currently exist, it has been clearly shown that the alternative options available to the superpowers, and above all to the USSR, are today far more numerous than heretofore.

"What are the implications of all of this for Western Europe?

"The strategic potentials of the two major powers having been considered neutralized, Western Europe has until now been at the mercy of a possible large-scale conventional attack to which it could not respond except with the threat of nuclearizing the conflict.

"Today there is added to this scenario the possibility of destroying European military objectives, selecting if need be those belonging to this or that nation, thanks to the SS 20 mobile, hence practically invulnerable, missile, characterized by low power, high accuracy, and, it is said, minimum collateral effects. Cognizance must also be taken of all the advantages the initiative represents for one who decides to undertake a military action.

"Faced by this new threat, and situated as they are on the front line, it is understandable that the people of the Federal Republic of Germany that they should be engaged in bitter discussion regarding their proposed line of conduct.

"The absence of such reactions in France, and in particular the fact that the issue was hardly even brought up in the recent election campaign, can only be deplored.

"France, the only truly independent nuclear decision center in Europe, occupies a special position, even though the scenarios permitted by its forces are limited, and even though the threat of massive retaliation against cities remains its last recourse in case of major aggression.

"That our president of the republic intends to maintain that position was made abundantly clear during his press conference of 15 February, in the course of which, while refusing to comment on the SALT II agreements, which had not yet been concluded, he nevertheless very clearly stated: 'France has every reason not to take part in the SALT III negotiations on the gray zone--because its own defense system is a central system.'

"In any case, even if the agreements currently being projected as a natural sequel to those of SALT II were to succeed in imposing limits on the theater systems of both sides, the Europeans would for the moment have no means whatever of their own to verify faithful compliance.

"The important thing is actually that the USSR, while fully advocating detente and attending all the conferences organized on this issue, has until now not proposed a single definitive step, either to implement Helsinki or in regard to balanced reduction of forces.

"The SALT II agreements, as Mr Delbourg so well put it, represent 'less the main highway of detente and mutual comprehension than the privileged by way of American-Soviet dialogue, which can however absolutely not be divested of "coupling"'.
"

"It is this more or less precarious coupling which will warrant a determined vigilance on our part should we one day take part in SALT III, and which obviously justifies maintaining the credibility attained by the French nuclear forces."

FOOTNOTES

1. This is the issue in the FRG but also, respective differences being considered, in Rumania.
2. Deterrence within a war.
3. Editor's note: Meaning the claimed American lag behind the Soviets in the field of missiles.
4. Cf. especially his televised interview of 13 November 1978.
5. This is what Richard Burt had felt he could already say last year: "U.S. Moving Toward Vast Revision of Its Strategy on Nuclear Warfare" (New York TIMES, 30 November 1978).
6. Editor's note: Technology that makes it possible to fight a nuclear war.
7. Speech of 5 April 1979 in New York.
8. Cf. notably Fritz Ermath "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought"; INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (Fall 1979).
9. American mobile land-missile.
10. Editor's note: Meaning they are based in Europe.
11. An exhaustive and revealing introspection on this debate is given in the issue dedicated to it by WASHINGTON QUARTERLY (Winter 1979).
12. American SALT negotiator under the previous administration and adviser to the "Committee on the Present Danger."

13. A third one should be added, according to which SALT II is unsatisfactory to the extent that it fails to go far enough in the limitations it imposes on strategic competition.
14. Speech before the members of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.
15. The figures quoted below are not claimed to be exact, and are taken from unrestricted sources.
16. Notably Mr Les Aspin.
17. Cf. article by Michel Tatu: "The Difficulties of Disarmament" (LE MONDE 10-11 June 1979).
18. Editor's note: In English the term "decoupling" is being used to mean the uncoupling of the American engagement in Europe from commitment of American strategic nuclear forces.
19. Meaning arms capable of being launched from Soviet territory and striking the territory of European members of the Atlantic Alliance, and vice versa.
20. For the United States, cf. previously cited article by H. Kissinger, and for Europe the article by M. F. de Rose in LE MONDE 16 March 1979.
21. As stressed by Pierre Lellouche: "France, SALT and the Security of Europe" in POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, No 2, 1979.
22. In this regard cf. article by J. L. Gergorin: "The SALT Negotiations and the Security of Europe" in DEFENSE NATIONALE, June 1978.

9399

CSO: 3100

NORDLI WARNS PALME: ENERGY AGREEMENT WON'T BE EASY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Sep 79 p 5

[Commentary by Lars Hellberg]

[Text] Prime Minister Odvar Nordli damped the ardor of his Swedish fellow partisans considerably when, at last Sunday's Social Democratic border meeting at Arvika, he strongly emphasized the problems involved in bringing about a Norwegian-Swedish energy and industrial agreement, no matter "which government is in power." At a meeting with the press, he, moreover, caused Olof Palme some worry by stating openly that the Norwegian Workers Party sees obvious tactical advantages in the Conservative Party emerging as the decidedly strongest party on the non-Socialist side.

At the time, the Swedish opposition leader had, for two days, been lecturing on the "threat" posed by the increasingly stronger Conservative wave in Sweden as well. Nordli described our domestic situation as follows: "To many voters, the Conservative Party appears as the obvious non-Socialist alternative to the Workers Party. We, on our part, have done our utmost to bring out the very fact that the clear and unambiguous dividing line runs between the policy of the Conservative Party and that of the Social Democratic Party," said Nordli, who, to the surprise of Palme saw obvious tactical advantages in the Norwegian Conservative Party becoming the dominant party on the non-Socialist side.

However, they were in beautiful agreement that it was primarily the lack of direction among the center parties which "had justified" both the Conservative Party and the Swedish Moderate Coalition Party in the eyes of the voters, and that, despite different tactical evaluations, the main task was to prevent the advance of the Conservatives.

To the press, Nordli was very careful in pointing out that there have been no negotiations between Palme and himself on a Norwegian-Swedish energy and industrial agreement as an alternative to the abortive Volvo agreement. Nordli also took the opportunity to stress that, despite the existing broad willingness to cooperate, there are problems which hitherto have proved insurmountable when it comes to translating declarations of willingness into firm realities.

"And that will be the actual situation, regardless which government is in power. This is no ideological question," Nordli said.

The Arvika meeting, at any rate, did not provide any ammunition to the Swedish Social Democrats, who, in the election campaign, are trying to make capital on their ostensibly greater willingness and ability than the People's Party government to provide Sweden with Norwegian oil supplies.

Incidentally, the Norwegian prime minister, with an ironical smile, repudiated the claim that he had come to help Palme in the election campaign. "I have come here to talk about the threat of mass unemployment, about the struggle for employment, and about job and incomes security. These are common tasks which require cooperation. I would have come to talk about these problems even if, for that reason, the gates of hell had opened up," Nordli said.

The prime minister warned in his speech against using measures such as longer vacations, shorter working hours, and the like, as solutions to acute unemployment problems. "The fundamental basis for full employment is an active, progressive economic policy. It is only a competitive, rational economy--in the first instance, the industries--which can give us the economic basis for the policy which will give work to everybody," he pointed out.

7262

CSO: 3108

LITTLE CHANCE FOR HEADWAY IN OCTOBER'S JAN MAYEN TALKS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Sep 79 p 18

[Commentary by Morten Fyhn: "Danish Move Complicates New Negotiations"]

[Text] Norway and Iceland have agreed to resume the negotiations on Jan Mayen in Reykjavik in the latter half of October. But if the parties will not make substantial concessions, there is also not today reason to expect a solution to the conflict. The situation, moreover, has become further complicated by the fact that Denmark now has asked to state its opinion before Iceland and Norway adopt final agreements on Jan Mayen.

In connection with the meeting of Nordic foreign ministers at Reykjavik, Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund and the Icelandic Foreign Minister Benedikt Grondal have not had any discussions on Jan Mayen. In informal talks, they have merely been trying to reach an agreement on the further negotiating procedure. Normally, the next round of negotiations would be taking place in Oslo. The fact that the meeting has been scheduled to take place in Reykjavik instead has been meant as a token of goodwill from the Norwegian side. The desire on the part of the Norwegian government to avoid conflict with Iceland is firm.

According to information received by AFTENPOSTEN, there is little optimism in Norwegian quarters prior to the negotiations in October as it seems clear that Iceland will then not only want to discuss the question of fishing but also the continental shelf and the resources at the bottom of the sea.

As early as in 1963, Norway adopted a resolution to the effect that the shelf at Jan Mayen is Norwegian. The Icelandic view that the shelf belongs to Iceland and that the country at least is entitled to more than half the resources there, is regarded in Norwegian quarters as absolutely unacceptable and not the subject of negotiations. Iceland's Prime Minister Olafur Johannesson is among those who have advanced this view on Iceland's rights.

Norway sticks to the view that the negotiations concerning Jan Mayen should be concentrating on the question of fishing, i.e. on the fishing zone, and not on an economic zone, at this point. In Norwegian quarters it is feared that the new negotiations will break down at once if Iceland sticks to its demand regarding the continental shelf.

Danish Note

Earlier this week, Denmark sent identical notes to Iceland and Norway on the Jan Mayen negotiations. Danish Foreign Minister Henning Christophersen has told AFTENPOSTEN that, according to the regulations governing Greenland's home rule, the government in Copenhagen is responsible for questions concerning maritime zones. The background to the Danish notes is the fact that the government in Copenhagen is "actively considering" extending East Greenland's fishing limit north of the 67° parallel to 200 nautical miles.

This 200-mile limit will border on Iceland's fishing limit and a Jan Mayen zone, if any. This will give rise to a question of dividing line, which must be solved. Foreign Minister Henning Christophersen says that Denmark does not want a result between Norway and Iceland on Jan Mayen to anticipate the coming Danish negotiations with Norway and Iceland. Denmark, therefore, has asked the governments in Oslo and Reykjavik to be kept continuously up-to-date on the Jan Mayen talks and has, furthermore, asked for permission to submit Danish views before a final agreement is reached between Norway and Iceland. In actual fact, this means that Denmark may take the opportunity to make reservations regarding the content of the Icelandic-Norwegian solution.

Complicated

South of the 67° parallel, the 200-mile limit of East Greenland and that of Iceland have become demarcated according to the center line principle. Iceland has done the same thing towards the Faroe Islands but refuses to do it towards a Jan Mayen zone. Iceland today lays claim to the "grey zone" at Jan Mayen. The strongly growing Danish interest in the Jan Mayen negotiations contributes to further complicating the already extremely difficult problems of maritime limits in the north.

To Iceland, a zone at East Greenland means that the fishermen from the EC countries will have access to fishing in the area and possibly in the Icelandic zone, as a consideration for Icelandic fishing in the Greenland zone. It is a well-known fact that Iceland is extremely busy trying to prevent fishing on the part of the so-called third-party countries.

In its reply to Denmark, Norway has promised that the Danes will be given all the details on the Jan Mayen talks, at the same time stating that the country should, of course, be permitted to express its views on an agreement, if any, with Iceland on Jan Mayen.

7262

CSO: 3108

PROGRESS, PRESENT STATE OF PLQ ASSESSED

Liberal Party Transformation

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 25 Aug 79 pp 1, 6

[Article by Jean-Claude Picard: "The PLQ [Liberal Party of Quebec] Transformed"]

[Text] Quebec--Transformed from top to bottom, purged of the elements that led to its losing, the Liberal Party of Quebec (PLQ) has been living under a good star for about 15 months.

In a strong position because of its revival, its own victories in the partial elections and reversals of its Pequist adversary, the PLQ today appears to be more than the top opposition party in the National Assembly. It has truly become a credible and plausible alternative solution.

Those in government circles or elsewhere who make fun of the liberals or tend not to take seriously those whom they still consider "Robert Bourassa's remains" should take care. Inspired by a new chief and fired by legislation that forced it to question and renew itself, the PLQ is stronger than ever, and is raking over the referendum and electoral ground in a way that is as amazing as it is orderly.

In fact, the liberals' good fortune began early in 1978, when Claude Ryan, who had until then been isolated in his LE DEVOIR confessional, decided to make a bid for the party's leadership.

Whether or not one agrees with his ideas and the leadership he intends to stamp on Quebec, Ryan is a great leader, and his arrival in the Liberal Party had more beneficial effects than negative consequences.

From the first weeks of the race for the leadership, Mr Ryan rallied around him those who desired an in-depth change within the liberal troup. Men like Guy St. Pierre or Claude Castonguay spontaneously joined his ranks. Even more significant, hundreds of ordinary citizens who had no other glory than that they had been seduced by the candidate's editorials, offered their services.

The April 1978 Congress was not an election, but a plebiscite. Ryan, with almost 70 percent of the votes, got the better of his only opponent, Raymond Garneau. The former editor of LE DEVOIR, long and well experienced in political symbols, would be the last one to make a mistake about the meaning of the vote: the liberals had not entrusted the party's leadership to him; they had just simply abandoned the party to him.

In his first speech as chief, when the electoral ashes were all still warm, he repudiated the past, had only a few appropriate words for the defeated candidate and his supporters, and urged his rank and file to outdo themselves and to sacrifice.

To this Catholic Action man the first thing the PLQ would have to do would be to find again the moral direction it had lost with the passage of too many years of power and political laxity.

His ideologic conservatism also agreed rather well with the order he intended to establish. The PLQ, he said then, must cease to be a gathering of racketeers and become again the party of uprightness and stability.

The liberals had emerged worried and wounded from the electoral results of 1976 and the many real or presumed scandals that had spattered the Bourassa administration. Ryan proposed the conversion of Marie Madeleine and it was that return to virginity that the PLQ celebrated first on the evening of his election as head of the party.

Hermann Mathieu, the liberal candidate in Beauce-Sud, said recently that he had long been ashamed to call himself a liberal. Today that shame is a thing of the past and it is rather with a crusader's pride that he calls himself a Ryanist.

And the results of the party's latest recruitment campaign--in which liberals went from 60,000 to some 180,000 members--demonstrate quite eloquently that Ryan's arrival, combined with the referendum day of reckoning, drained toward the PLQ thousands of citizens who have confidence in the man and the political lifestyle he is proposing.

Even more than his person, Claude Ryan has given back to the Liberal Party an intellectual leadership that was seriously lacking.

To the former editor of LE DEVOIR the basic principles have always been simple and clear: on the one hand, a federalism, just as much interested in building a new Canada as in preserving or expanding provincial powers--in that regard, his latest statement on natural wealth is rather eloquent--and, on the other hand, a socioeconomic conservatism based on expanding individual freedom and narrowing the field of state intervention.

This is the liberal credo, and woe unto him who would have the bad taste to depart from it. Of course discussion is still permitted within the PLQ; it may even be said to be more intense than ever there, but in the end the thinking and desires of the chief always prevail.

Several months ago, for example, some liberals were waging a more or less open campaign to urge the party not to publish its constitutional platform before the referendum was held. To those people, whose basic inspiration came from the federal big brothers, the PLQ's task was to fight the sovereignist thesis, and not propose from now on its own vision of the revived federalism.

Well, that campaign quickly died in embryo, no one daring to disagree openly with the chief's intentions and everyone being persuaded that, whatever they did, the PLQ would publish its constitutional manifesto, since that was what Mr Ryan desired.

Authority over the party's intellectual progress was also swiftly doubled by seizing total control of all the Party's proceedings.

Ryan reorganized and restructured the party's administration, notably by doubling the number of personnel assigned to county organizations. The trustees of the electoral treasury, most of all Paul Desrochers, were thanked for their services, the finances now being administered by a committee chosen by the party's executive board and no longer solely by the chief. The leaders of the county associations were purged, as well as the leaders of the regional executive boards.

Pierre Bibeau, the organization's new leader, estimates that at least 80 percent of those who, county by county, constitute what is called "the pillars" of the party have been replaced. Some were tired, others did not like Mr Ryan's style of leadership, finally others were bluntly invited to resign.

Even in recent days the leaders of one county association, who did not manage to adjust to the chief's new directives, were invited to leave their posts. If they don't do it, to clarify what Mr Bibeau has said, the association will simply be put under a guardianship.

The new chief had available two extremely powerful arguments for going ahead with this reorganization and imposing his choices.

In the first place the PLQ was in a rather stagnant condition when he took over its leadership in April 1978. The deputy from Bonaventure, Gerard-D. Levesque, had of course succeeded in avoiding ruin and consolidating what remained of the troops, but the absence of a permanent chief prevented any new momentum.

Where popular financing was concerned the situation was pitiable. Dr. Victor Goldbloom had really tried an early experiment, but the results had been disastrous: a mere few hundred thousand dollars after months and months of a very arduous campaign.

In the second place--and this is perhaps the most important point--Mr Ryan made use of Law No 2 on financing political parties to make his people understand that the PLQ no longer had a choice, that it must democratize itself and open itself to the population if it wanted to survive, even if only in financial terms.

In that regard, it is no exaggeration to say that this law was his most powerful ally in his task of reorganizing the party's structures.

Today the Liberal Party of Quebec is producing a class of political rank and file who may easily be compared with what may be found in the Quebecois Party. The people are interested, motivated and ready to work 12 months out of the year.

As it is in the PQ [Parti Quebecois], it is now the county structure that is responsible for financing campaigns, census and recruitment campaigns--and of course for electoral struggles.

But although he has reorganized the party and given new air to members whom years of power had gradually asphyxiated, Claude Ryan has nonetheless inherited defects of his predecessors, the most obvious of which, of course, is the amounts of money that were filling the party's treasury at the time of his arrival and some of which, it seems, are of rather doubtful provenance.

In this regard, the revelations made before the Malouf Commission bothered several people. The \$700,000 supplied by two important Olympic contractors are still in the Party's treasury and will remain there, the chief indicates, for as long as that investigating commission has not submitted its report.

Within the party, several people acknowledge that this affair is very disagreeable and that it constitutes a ball and chain as long as no one gets rid of the money. But there again, no one dares overtly confront a chief who is rather meticulous where money is concerned.

Still less does anyone dare to confront him when all liberals freely admit that until now Ryan "has delivered the goods" beyond all expectations.

The last financing campaign reported nearly \$2,000,000 and the Party easily won the three by-elections that have taken place since the 1976 general election.

Of course it is recognized that three counties are involved there--Notre Dame de Grace, Argenteuil and Jean Talon--that are already heavily liberal, but the fact remains that through these victories the Party has retained an impression of new invincibility.

Thus, with regard to the new partial elections announced for mid-November in Prevost, Beauce-Sud and Maisonneuve Counties, the party is already said to be assured of two victories and is far from counting itself beaten in the county that has been represented for almost ten years by the Pequiste, Robert Burns.

If it happens, and the liberals gain the three counties, the wave that seems to be carrying them currently could only take on still more magnitude, while the rout of the ministerials would then become almost catastrophic.

Party Leadership

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 27 Aug 79 pp 1, 6

[Text] Quebec--Even though he works like a demon, takes almost no vacation and participates directly in all of the party's major work, Claude Ryan

obviously cannot assume alone the enormous power it holds over Quebec's liberals and the deputies who form its parliamentary wing.

To get there he depends on a team of about 20 immediate associates, some of whom were salvages from the old Bourassist regime, but most of whom came to the party at about the same time as Mr Ryan.

Somewhat like what prevails in the Quebecois party, the new liberal chief's entourage is relatively young, well educated and totally devoted.

Whether at party headquarters on Gilford Road, in Montreal, or at the National Assembly, Ryan's men were chosen for their loyalty to the liberal cause and the man who is assuming direction of the party.

They all avow a boundless admiration for Mr Ryan, rarely allow themselves to joke around him and become livid at the very idea of falling into disgrace.

Prudent and measured, they are very discreet with journalists, only rarely give away organization secrets and are constantly willing to protect and defend their chief.

Federalists by choice rather than by ambition, several militate at the federal as well as the provincial level, and all of them swear mortal hatred for the Pequistes and sovereignty-association.

Even though Mr Ryan denies that takes advice from one more than the other and really likes to draw from several sources before making a decision, three persons clearly appear to have key positions in the liberal organization and to be closer than all the others to the decision centers.

They are Pierre Pettigrew, who is Mr Ryan's administrative assistant, Lina Allard, who is responsible for the party program and Pierre Bibeau, who is probably Mr Ryan's chief adviser.

A discreet and reserved man, Pierre Pettigrew is not very well known among parliamentary journalists, even though he has been attached to the liberal leader for a little over a year now.

His office as administrative assistant, where in a way he replaced Jean-Claude Rivest, who is now deputy from Jean Talon, gives him the primary responsibility for the party's parliamentary strategy.

Billeted in an office adjoining that of Mr Ryan, he is the one who advises the deputies on what attitude to adopt vis-a-vis some bill or other and rules over the party's parliamentary personnel.

At least in Quebec, Pierre Pettigrew is in a way the chief's alter ego. He is informed about everything and no important decision is made without his assent.

At the parliamentary personnel level he has easily supplanted with Mr Ryan the long-time liberals, such as former deputies Jacques Veilleux or Marc-Yvan Cote, both party researchers.

Pettigrew's career is that of a brilliant student whom the university systems quickly directed toward European institutions. The course he ran is a classic one: Jesuit College, Laval University and Oxford University.

After a brief stay in Quebec in 1975, where Mr Ryan met him for the first time and hired him as a journalist on LE DEVOIR, Pierre Pettigrew returned to Europe, where he became director of the Political Commission in the NATO Assembly.

It was during his contact with these European institutions that Pettigrew lost his independentist convictions and became a federalist. "The IQ plan," he was to say, "is a Utopia, since political liberties follow from economic liberties."

His federalist convictions were to prove profitable quickly, since he returned to Canada in 1978, where for several months he occupied the post of administrative assistant to Andre Guellet, then federal urban affairs minister.

His attachment to the PLQ centered essentially on the person of Mr Ryan, whom he joined in the early months of his becoming head of the party.

In the eyes of Pettigrew Mr Ryan is exactly the kind of man to keep Quebec within the federal regime and give the province the clear and orderly leadership which, according to him, it greatly needs.

This is somewhat the same kind of approach that Mrs Lina Allard conducted in the Liberal Party; she is in fact now one of the two key administrators of the central organization.

Mrs Allard is a woman of almost 35, an attorney by profession, who was never mixed up in politics before Claude Ryan went after the PLQ leadership.

It was through Mrs Madeleine Ryan, with whom Lina Allard worked at the school level, that she entered into contact with the candidate to succeed Robert Bourassa.

She became general secretary of his campaign and entered the party administration in the weeks following his election.

Mrs Allard's job is basically connected with the PLQ program. In charge of the party's Political Commission, she has supreme control over all the sub-commissions charged with perfecting the party's platform.

Until now she has concentrated her efforts mainly on the Constitutional Commission, which in November is to submit a document outlining the type of revived federalism the Liberal Party wants.

Her attachment to the PLQ comes both from her federalist convictions and her annoyance with the socio-democratic tendencies ~~she~~ believes she detects in the governmental party.

To her, the Quebecois now have a very clear choice between the political liberalism her Party professes and the socializing measures the PQ defends.

Although Lina Allard is busy with the contents and for months has been preparing what will be the party's next electoral program, in other respects it is Pierre Bibeau who is looking after the container, as the great leader of the party organization.

In contrast to the other two, Pierre Bibeau is what might be called a political professional. Even though he is just 32, he has already been working for about ten years in one capacity or another in party administration.

Pierre Bibeau defines himself as a "nationalist liberal" and he swears he could just as well have worked with the Pequistes if they had been the first to require his services.

In fact, he was formerly a member of the MSA [Movement for Sovereignty-Association], but left the movement when it was joined with the RIN [Rally for Independence] and the RN [National Rally] to found the PQ, having decided that the independentists should accept into their ranks the people of the National Rally, a party that he then believed was a rightist group.

Several months later he was rescued by Paul Desrochers, who invited him to work on Robert Bourassa's election as chief of the liberals. Thus he made his debut with the "kingmaker" and was never to leave after the liberal seraglio.

From 1970 to 1974 he worked mainly with liberal youth and the party's Political Commission; from 1974 until last January he was the leader of the organization in the Montreal region.

Since the beginning of the year Bibeau has been the party organization's grand master. His main job is to see to it that Ryan's men and ideas are to be found in all local and regional administrations.

His long years of service have enabled him to know nearly everyone, and no detail escapes him. He will advise the chief on the choosing of candidates, will tell him whether such-and-such county chairman is a trustworthy man, will carefully carry out the changes desired by the party leadership.

Pierre Bibeau's function has become all the more important since Mr Ryan came to head the party; the party no longer has a director general, Ronald Poupart,

who occupied the post in the last years of the Bourassa regime, having sent in his resignation.

Bibeau dreams of making the PLQ a completely transformed party, as active and militant as the Parti Quebecois.

"On the evening of 15 November 1976 I was obviously disappointed by our defeat, but I was happy for the PQ guys [translation unknown], because I believed their victory was the fruit of long political organization labor," he says.

Today he says he is happy to have shown, after six or eight months of very intensive work, an organization that in nearly all counties joins with the neighborhood structures and goes all the way to the polls.

According to him the PLQ has for too long been content to be a party that worked only during electoral campaigns. In his eyes, victory in the next general election will depend mainly on the liberals' ability to offer the citizens an open political instrument that is democratic and ready to work 12 months out of the year.

Little Criticism

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 28 Aug 79 pp 1, 6

[Text] Quebec--These days it is not easy to find within the Liberal Party of Quebec anyone who dares present a vision the least bit critical of the changes being carried out inside the party since Claude Ryan assumed its direction.

In all the liberal nooks and crannies, from the Reform Club all the way to the offices of attorneys and contractors, this is rather a time for praise and congratulations. Although the first months of the new chief's reign were difficult, there are now congratulations for the party's recent electoral successes, for Mr Ryan's ascending popularity in public opinion, and it is being said that as long as that lasts there is no reason to express any doubt as to whether the various operations in progress are well-founded.

Since the April 1978 Leadership Congress, public rebuffs have been rare. Raymond Garneau's supporters are lying low at home when they have not been out-and-out eliminated from command posts. The men of the Bourassa have, with a few exceptions, taken their pawns out of the game. The parliamentary wing has wisely returned to the ranks. Briefly, nearly everyone has preferred to remain quiet and leave the field free for Mr Ryan.

In fact, the only challenge to his leadership occurred last spring, when a group of liberal militants from Jean-Talon County in Quebec, supported more or less discreetly by several deputies and party researchers, proposed the candidacy of Jean-Claude Rivest, a former adviser to former Prime Minister Robert Bourassa, as a replacement for Mr Garneau.

Claude Ryan is known to have wanted another candidacy less tied to the Bourassist past, and actually tested the ground with regard to various persons

of the Quebec region, including Claude Garcia and Dr. Yves Morin, but he was beaten by Mr Rivest's partisans and finally had to bow to the militants' choice.

That one exception aside, the liberal chief has been sailing over an extremely calm sea since he acceded to the leadership of the party and is very careful to do nothing that might stir up dissidence.

However, there are still some liberals who remain skeptical about his style of leadership and who are still not much impressed by his performance. The former communications minister, Jean-Paul L'Allier, is one of them and is not afraid to say so publicly.

"Ryan is part of the same political generation as Trudeau and Lovesque. All three are leaders from another age, authoritarian, not very prone to participation," he said during a recent interview with LE DEVOIR.

Jean-Paul L'Allier is still a member of the PLQ and even chairs a sub-commission of the Political Commission, but remarks a little sadly that his group was not called upon to meet more than once or twice in the last year.

"Claude Ryan is about to take the party into his own hands, to make it 'his thing.' On the one hand, no one can object to his success, but neither can anyone say that the PLQ has again become what it was in the early sixties--a party in which many ideas were tossed around," adds Mr L'Allier.

Mr L'Allier believes that the liberals are much too complacent around their new chief, and as an example he mentions Mr Ryan's latest statement on the subject of natural wealth, when the liberal chief affirmed that the federal government should have the power to intervene in a case of national emergency.

"I don't recall," he said, "that this question had previously been discussed in a party congress. On the contrary, the liberals have always defended provincial ownership of natural wealth, yet no one stood up against the chief's position."

Mr L'Allier believes that his chief relies a little too easily on a captive clientele--federalists on one hand and conservatives on the other--and does not bother to attract into the ranks the young and progressive electorate who, according to him, would be the real nucleus of renewal within the PLQ.

In fact, he said, Ryan is running the party to suit himself and transforming it in his own image. As long as things go well for him he will not run into great difficulties, but if he experiences reverses, the wind that is favorable to him now might turn quite swiftly.

Finally, Mr L'Allier considers the liberal chief to be wrong in wanting to be the big boss of the federalist forces at the time of the referendum.

According to him, federal liberals and conservatives set "a bear trap" for him when they proposed to register under his banner during the referendum campaign.

Mr L'Allier compares the constitutional debate to an employer-union negotiation in which the federal government represents the employers' side and Quebec the union side.

"Mr Ryan should be content with wanting to replace the union side. If he becomes the spokesman for all federalists, the population will perceive him more as the representative of the employers' side," concludes Mr L'Allier.

In his opinion the liberal chief is committing a grave error in trying to be identified more with Canada than with Quebec in the ongoing debate, and thus he risks losing substantial support among the population.

8946

CSO: 3100

QUEBEC BY-ELECTION CANDIDATES DISCUSSED

Montreal LA PRESSE in French 5 Sep 79 p A 2

[Article by Marc Laurendeau: "Remote-Controlled Candidacies" (special contribution)]

[Text] Seeing the way economist Pierre Harvey is soliciting investiture in Prevost, one gets the impression that the Graduate Business School professor has literally been drafted for the task. "I did not make this decision for the pleasure of the thing, but really to win this election," Mr Harvey stated at a press conference. The brilliant economist, adviser on the PQ [Parti Quebecois] program and a personal friend of Prime Minister Rene Levesque, seems to be acting on orders to save the situation in Prevost.

Nor is that somewhat remote-controlled candidacy an isolated case. It is part of a tendency that is beginning to be apparent in the Parti Quebecois. In a similar way, in fact, Pierre Renaud was mandated by Rene Levesque's entourage to battle Mrs Louise Harel in the race for the vice presidency of the organization. Moreover, in Maisonneuve County there are serious signs leading to the belief that the attorney, former adviser to the CSN [expansion unknown] and former administrative assistant, Jacques Desmarais (a candidate whose program gives the impression of solid preliminary preparation) received Prime Minister Levesque's benediction for standing in the way of the former president of CSN Construction, Michel Bourdon (Louise Harel's husband). Labor Minister Pierre-Marc Johnson also favored Jacques Desmarais' candidacy over that of the fiery unionist.

A new constant seems to be emerging. The orthodox wing of the Parti Quebecois embodied in the prime minister and the most prudent members of the cabinet, are taking measures to counterbalance the influence of the most radical movement. It is known that in the battle for the vice presidency the radical wing succeeded in getting its candidate, Louise Harel, passed, while the prime minister's group suffered a reversal. If it happens that at the Pequiste convention, to be held soon in Prevost and Maisonneuve, the candidates supported by Mr Levesque are also defeated, the failure would be a terribly crushing one. No doubt the government would have no other choice but to compromise from now on with the most radical militancy that is expressed inside the party.

It is important to emphasize that these practices are not at all uncommon in these times. Inside all organizations the leaders have preferences and do not put themselves out to make them known behind the scenes. We also see ministers support a candidacy that seems to them to conform better to their vision of the party. In the federal district of Terrebonne, shortly before the May 1977 by-elections, Marc Lalonde and Andre Ouellet appeared to favor the candidacy of Mrs Celine Payette over that of Roland Comtois, who finally triumphed. A more ludicrous case occurred in 1973 in the provincial county of St. Jacques, when Jerome Choquette, then a minister in the Bourassa cabinet, even succeeded, according to official sources, in having the liberal convention nullified which had just elected a well-known criminal law specialist. The novelty is the result of candidacies to order, in order to protect the orthodox thinking of the government and the party.

It should also be observed that Claude Ryan is far from being uninterested in the selection of those who will carry the liberal banner in the by-elections. In Prevost he overcame his first preference, to offer the candidacy himself to Mrs Chaput-Rolland, whereas in Beauce it was the man of his own choosing, Hermann Mathieu, who sought investiture. However, with regard to Maisonneuve County, the Liberal Party is encountering difficulties similar to those of the Parti Quebecois in Prevost. Mr Ryan has not succeeded in convincing Luc Larivee (who now has his eye on the Montreal city hall) or Pierre Lorange; the hunt for the professional practicing in the county and for the notable well-known for school administration still leaves the liberals empty-handed in that Pequiste fortress.

Prime Minister Levesque and the organizer of the Parti Quebecois for these by-elections have really made sure that the predominant group in the cabinet is embodied in a candidate seeking investiture, in Prevost as well as in Maisonneuve. But why was Beauce-Sud neglected? In the latter case, closing of the nominations was set so early that there was only one candidate in the ranks. This behavior on the part of the top authorities of the Pequiste electoral organization might lead one to think that the Pequiste government did not believe its chances were very good in that district, with its old Creditist and liberal heritage.

It is an absurd situation, in terms of ideologic coherence. The Pequiste government is favoring reassuring candidacies in order to check the influence of its party's radical wing; in passing, the prime minister is scarcely encouraging the candidacy of Pierre Bourgault, an early-day independentist militant. But at the same time the speeches of the Pequiste candidate show that Raymond Boisvert seems to confuse sovereignty and the new federalism. However, he profits from the support of the prime minister.

Pierre Harvey launched his campaign for investiture with a criticism of the Pepin-Robarts report, stressing that this document limits Quebec's aspirations to the cultural area, without sufficiently taking into account the economic demands of the Quebecois community. The comment, especially coming from an economist, is legitimate and hits directly at the bullseye. Mr Harvey, if he were to be victorious at the 16 September convention, could keep the political debate to a high level, which should be cause for rejoicing. But a

populist speaker would have had a better chance of posting a performance comparable to that of that great communicator, Mrs Chaput-Rolland, of acting as a counterbalance to her in the ballot boxes.

One sometimes wonders if the Pequiste government has not sacrificed the possibility of a more extensive victory (than one simply limited to Maisonneuve) to the imperatives of the orthodox thinking in the organization. How then are we to interpret Mr Harvey's sentence, when he affirms that "the November by-elections do not constitute a preliminary indication of the results of the referendum"? Undoubtedly that means that the Pequiste doctrine on sovereignty-association will be the same during these elections as at the time of the referendum, but that the voting results could be different. The precaution taken by Mr Harvey is rather revealing.

8946

CSO: 3100

SPD DEFENSE POLICY ATTACKED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 14 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Guenther Gillessen: "Social Democratic Fathomings"]

[Text] Defense policy seems to be once again well sheltered in the SPD. A statement of the party presidium prepared for the coming party congress gives "political priority" to arms control policy, yet "at the same time" the door is left open for necessary defense decisions. On the one hand there is to be a "fathoming" of the possibilities for a "cooperative directing of armaments," on the other hand the "attempts" to achieve a balance are to continue. And while one passage states that "detente" is creating trust, another one says that the "armament behavior"—that's how it is expressed, with no value judgment--of the Soviet Union "gives rise to doubts regarding the motives of Soviet arms policy."

The minister of defense and the federal chancellor can be quite satisfied with these formulations. The text does not prevent them from making responsible security policy. The statement leaves the doors open for all that is necessary, and it still tells the party's left wing all that it likes to hear. Very shrewdly put, experienced tacticians will say.

But a large party like the SPD will have to be prepared to answer whether it should not have a clearer concept of the FRG's security policy, and whether it cannot give its members and voters better leadership. How realistic are the SPD's foreign and defense policies? How does it perceive the East-West conflict? Does the arms race really consist of two leaderless machines that have to be controlled? It is thought that authors of the statement had not experienced the debate in the Western countries over the technological, military, political and financial implications of new weapons.

Within the last years arms control has played an increasing role in arms acquisitions. America has either completely given up on many interesting weapon systems (B-1 bomber), or has delayed decision on them (neutron bomb, long-range cruise missile, Pershing II), or has for arms control considerations made the installation of new weapons more complicated at high additional

cost (the "movable" MX missile silo system). Since the 1960s America has no longer been preaching superiority but "adequate security"-- that is much less than a balance of power--as the maxim of Western defense policy. For years the movement has taken place in the lower limits of necessity.

On hand of SALT policy and the offer of Reykjavik regarding conventional disarmament in Europe the Western countries have stubbornly attempted for years to interest the Soviet Union in arms control. They have done what the SPD statement now demands--offered limited or final bans on development of certain weapons or on already existing potential. The Soviet Union accepted these offers only when they served to preserve its advantage in armaments or to make up disadvantages. The history of the test ban negotiations also prove this.

The wish of Western nations to decrease their arms burden has contributed to the steady deterioration of the balance of forces to the West's disadvantage over the last 15 years. But now comes a time when the modernization of one's own arms cannot be further delayed by "fathomings" whether the opponent will in the near future be prepared for a substantive disarmament policy. Now comes the time for decision. The modernization of nuclear arms is pending within NATO. The offer regarding nuclear weapons made at the Vienna MBFR talks cannot remain on the agenda for long. The alliance now needs the positions for Pershing missiles and 1,000 nuclear devices that have long since been offered at Vienna. If the Soviet Union is unwilling to reduce its superiority in armor then the alliance also needs the neutron weapon. If the Soviet Union does not want to give up the SS-20 missile then it has to understand that the other side will consider this to be increased pressure. Then it will be impossible to renew the moratorium on cruise missiles included in a protocol to the SALT II treaty.

Should the American president order these weapons into production he will want to be sure that the European governments will agree to their deployment. He should not have to fear that new internal political insecurities in Europe will develop, as was the case during the initial debate over the neutron weapon. It is obvious that each new Western weapon can be delayed for arms control reasons during every phase of its introduction--during invention, development, production and deployment. To demand that in the SPD paper only serves to make the political preparations for the impending nuclear decisions within the alliance less secure, and it will encourage the leadership in Moscow to prevent the west from improving its precarious situation with a storm of threats rather than substantive offers. The SPD paper has been written as if the party had no knowledge of three decades of disappointing attempts to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union in arms control matters.

9240

CSO: 3103

COALITION, OPPOSITION MP'S DIFFER ON SALT II

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Sep 79 pp 15-17

[Round-table discussion: "Political Assessment of SALT II"]

[Text] The treaty-signing ceremony at the Vienna Hofburg came to a close with a spontaneous hug and a "fraternal kiss" between President Carter and Party Chief Brezhnev, a practice heretofore confined to East bloc dignitaries. In the United States, where the treaty must clear the Senate, criticism and calls for caution voiced earlier have multiplied as the arms race in the area of strategic missiles with multiple atomic warheads shows no real sign of abating, with the United States clearly running second. Also in the United States, the problems related to reciprocal inspection are being viewed with utmost skepticism. Although neither Europe nor the Europeans have a genuine say in the matter, the SALT II accords do have a direct bearing on the security of Europe and the Federal Republic. WEHRTECHNIK has therefore asked the senior defense spokesmen of the four parties represented in the Bundestag to comment on the Vienna accords. Responding on behalf of the government coalition were the following members of the Bundestag: Paul Neumann (SPD) and Juergen Moelleman (FDP) and for the opposition, Willi Weiskirch (CDU) and Dr Richard Jaeger (CSU).

WEHRTECHNIK: What is your opinion of the Soviet-American agreement overall?

Paul Neumann, SPD: SALT is a synonym for the dialogue on mutual security the superpowers have been conducting for almost ten years. This fact alone underscores the importance of the conclusion of the second treaty limiting strategic arms on both sides. Even if the treaty had not advanced matters at all, it would still have been worthwhile, if for no other reason than

that the superpowers had been engaged in a dialogue on mutual security throughout this time; this has by no means been detrimental to security as such!

Juergen Moellenmann, FDP: Politically, the agreement is significant in that the two superpowers managed to reach it by taking each other's security needs into account in a spirit of cooperation and give-and-take. This, as well as the fact that intensive discussions on security and military matters led SALT II to establish parity in a very detailed, precise and verifiable manner, contributes to mutual trust and makes for a greater degree of transparency and predictability, thereby increasing military and political stability. SALT II may thus provide the impetus for other arms control and arms limitation efforts.

Willi Weiskirch, CDU: SALT II envisages placing a limit on intercontinental nuclear weapons of both the United States and the Soviet Union and retaining or rather establishing approximate parity in strike capability. Agreement on the provisions of the treaty was preceded by difficult negotiations lasting several years. The value of the treaty is the subject of intense controversy--above all in the United States. But, if the Soviet Union adheres not only to the letter but to the spirit of SALT II, world peace can be made more secure.

Dr Richard Jaeger, CSU: There are three steps involved in any appraisal of SALT II. The first question is whether anything really spoke for concluding these agreements. Since the Foreign Relations Committee of the German Bundestag, of which I am a member, has not yet been supplied with an official translation, my doubts have not yet been dispelled.

Secondly, the U.S. Senate is faced with the question of whether to ratify the treaty. In this regard, one not only has to consider the provisions of the treaty itself, but also what effect the rejection of the treaty might have on foreign relations. I cannot say that I envy the American Senators their responsibility.

And finally, we Germans should not interfere in the internal American dispute about the ratification of SALT II. At the same time, however, we must insist upon our own legitimate interests and continue to point out that West European security must remain linked to the security of the United States.

WEHRTECHNIK: Do you think that SALT II is equal to the task of lowering the very high momentum of the arms race or will it merely succeed in freezing present levels?

Neumann, SPD: I think the treaty does not put a stop to the arms race but does set limits at a relatively high level. Although the Soviet Union must reduce its arsenal of strategic weapons by 300, it may--like the United States--carry on a substantial number of arms programs which permit an increase in the nuclear weapons total but no further addition to the number of strategic systems.

Moellemann, FDP: SALT II does not produce an appreciable reduction in the level of strategic nuclear arms. Previous SALT agreements, however, invariably set upper limits which in actual fact had not yet been reached. Without fail, this triggered another round in the arms race of the superpowers because neither of the two was willing to remain below these limits. SALT II, on the other hand, has frozen the number of strategic nuclear delivery systems at the level already reached. The Soviet Union is even required to dismantle 250 such systems. In a political sense, the significance of SALT II for the arms control process also lies in the conceivably favorable effect of initial reductions in certain areas and the adoption of a number of qualitative measures limiting the pace of technological development to some extent.

Weiskirch, CDU: The treaty clearly states that it aims to achieve approximate parity as between the existing arsenals. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility of cutting them down. But, we know from experience that the Soviet Union has--until now at least--shown no inclination to do so. Quite the contrary. I would merely remind you of their downright hectic medium-range missile buildup behind the veil of the SALT negotiations. But, as you know, the SALT treaty has not touched upon this "grey area." In this sense, SALT II cannot properly be called a blueprint for real reductions of the arms arsenals.

Jaeger, CSU: In my view, (SALT) is no more and no less than an agreement on arms limitation and not on disarmament.

WEHRTECHNIK: If and when the U.S. Senate has ratified the treaty, further SALT accords ought to be reached. What areas should they include, in your opinion?

Neumann, SPD: Although there is a lot to be said for the superpowers continuing the dialogue dealing with the weapons which concern them, this restriction must be viewed from another perspective in the future, i.e. that there is not only an intercontinental, but also a continental dimension to disarmament and arms control. It simply makes no sense for limitation being restricted to the intercontinental sphere while the Soviet Union engages in a relatively powerful continental nuclear buildup. This is why any SALT III package must not only include intercontinental subject matter as before, but questions affecting the European continent as well.

Moellemann, FDP: The SALT III negotiation must come to grips with and solve the problem of Soviet superiority in medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. The Soviets have said they are prepared to talk about this subject. By deploying their extremely accurate, mobile, multiple-warhead, reloadable SS-20 missiles, which constitute a threat to Europe, the Soviets have a medium-range nuclear strike capability which NATO is unable to match. (Aside from this problem,) the question of killer satellites and of civil defense should also be raised as part of SALT III or as an adjunct to it.

SALT III should also follow up on the measures adopted by SALT II to curb the rapid advances in arms technology, i.e. there should be an even stronger focus on the qualitative aspects of arms control.

Weiskirch, CDU: Further SALT agreements must deal with the "grey area" problem and correct it. As you know, SALT II merely placed a limit on the number of launch pads for ICBM's and not on the actual number of missiles. This question, too, would have to be clarified by subsequent SALT agreements. This is all the more important, since the United States, as a consequence of losing the bases in Iran and on the NATO southern flank, can no longer effectively exercise surveillance or verify Soviet compliance with the provisions of the treaty. There will thus be a need to agree upon a reciprocal inspection system.

Jaeger, CSU: In the light of the SALT II treaty, an accord relating to the so-called grey area weapons, i.e. the Euro-strategic medium-range missiles is of particular importance for the projected SALT III negotiations.

WEHRTECHNIK: Do you think it likely that SALT agreements could directly or indirectly influence the MBFR negotiations, which are marking time, as before?

Neumann, SPD: Sadly enough, your question has been answered by the Soviet Union in the meantime. Until recently, the Soviet media contended that the MBFR talks in Vienna could be conducted without regard to the SALT negotiations; but now they are making a continuation of MBFR contingent on ratification of SALT II by the American Senate. To my mind, SALT II thus does have a bearing on MBFR, despite the most recent Soviet overtures on the subject of collective security.

Moelleman, FDP: No one can predict how the Soviets will proceed once the SALT II process is concluded. But, one would hope that they would show as much sympathy for the West's desires for parity based on security considerations at SALT III and MBFR as the United States showed them in the course of the SALT negotiations. In other words, the Soviet must realize first of all that a clear definition of the premises is a prerequisite for a satisfactory outcome of MBFR.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher was right in saying: "An outcome which does not explicitly state either that parity has been achieved or that disparity has been frozen would lead to insecurity and sow the seeds of distrust." For that matter, such an outcome would not be approved by the parliaments of the NATO countries. It would, in effect, make a mockery of MBFR. The aim of MBFR, after all, is to attain greater trust and political stability by enhancing military security.

A more balanced relationship between the conventional forces of East and West would also call for raising the nuclear threshold. This is one more reason why we Free Democrats will not yield an inch on the principle of relative parity. In this connection, let me once more recall the declaration signed during the Bonn visit of Secretary General Brezhnev in May

1978 which stressed the importance both sides attach to the principle that no one country should aim for military superiority and that relative equality and parity are enough of a guarantee for defense. On the basis of an initiative to which the FRG contributed significantly and in which the Foreign Minister was personally involved, the alliance will submit a catalog of supportive measures in Vienna in the near future. These are measures designed to help verify any agreements to be reached by MBFR. The Soviet Union, for its part, has expressed some interest in this subject lately. There may even be a connection between this (expression of interest) and SALT III.

Weiskirch, CDU: The Chancellor delivered an unusually lengthy reply to the two motions on security policy brought by the CDU/CSU and the SPD/FDP in the German Bundestag. He said, in part: "There has been commendable progress toward a meeting of the minds at MFBR;--if this progress continues during the remainder of the year, we would be happy to meet on a ministerial level on SALT; there is agreement on this subject within the alliance--I believe that the final ratification of SALT could generate significant progress with respect to MBFR. We shall make use of this opportunity, if and when it arises."

As I see it, the Chancellor's statement seems to indicate that any influence SALT II might have on the still dormant MBFR negotiations has been part of the scenario all along. In the interest of European security, however, I do hope that this will not involve surrendering positions which are of the utmost importance to us Germans in particular.

Jaeger, CSU: I am not inclined to think that the ratification of the SALT II accords will help advance the MBFR negotiations in any objective way; but it may provide a psychological impetus.

WEHRTECHNIK: What are the consequences, if any, of the superpowers' agreement on SALT on the security of the alliance as a whole? Looking at the Federal Republic specifically--is it likely to enhance our own security or not?

Neumann, SPD: I am certain that the Soviet-American treaty will not have an adverse effect on the defense posture of the European alliance or of the FRG in the sense of lessened security. With respect to detente--which, after all, is tied to security--the treaty offers greater security without a doubt. It is evidence of the fact that the East-West dialogue on security partnership has by no means come to an end, despite some reverses suffered during the course of the detente process.

Moellemann, FDP: The SALT II accords offer a good basis for fruitful continuation of the detente process upon the success of which scarcely any country depends more than the FRG. SALT II protects the security interests of the European alliance and preserves the strength of the deterrent to aggression. This, too, is of prime importance to the FRG, since

it would be most gravely affected in case of a military confrontation between East and West by virtue of its geographic location. The parity principle agreed upon in SALT II, however, does accentuate Soviet superiority in the field of medium-range nuclear missiles. If our objective is to sustain flexible response capability and thereby credibility in the total deterrent force; if we mean to avoid the risks of a piecemeal breakup (of the alliance) and of exposure to political blackmail, then we must see to it that the imbalances below the nuclear threshold are rectified, in order to preserve the full-range response spectrum and thereby the deterrent structure as such.

The need is for arms control negotiations about medium-range missiles as part of SALT III as well as for a modernization of the American medium-range systems. All members of the alliance have recognized this need; they should now see to jointly satisfying it. This also requires an understanding of the problems involved on the part of the public. This awareness will probably be forthcoming once it is pointed out that the need to modernize arises solely from the arms buildup of the Soviet Union and that modernization does not aim either at an increase in nuclear warheads in Europe or at a stronger emphasis on nuclear weapons as such or at an arms program designed to reach parity.

In this connection, we welcome the U.S. Government's statement that it intends to protect Allied security interests and its declaration that the treaty leaves all defense and arms control options open upon its termination and that it neither places limits on the existing practice of cooperation with the Allies, nor does it foreclose cooperation with respect to modernization.

Weiskirch, CDU: The FRG must first consult with its European NATO partners to determine which military programs are indispensable for an effective deterrent. At this point, I would refer only to the Neutron bomb and the Pershing-2.

If the European members of NATO can agree on common measures to modernize the nuclear arms arsenal, the SALT accords will have been instrumental in providing greater security--for the FRG, among others. What I am afraid of, however, is that our federal government may once again adopt a position of irresolution and constraint vis-a-vis the United States. As in the case of the Neutron bomb, it expects the Americans to think and act more European than the Europeans and more German than we Germans. I am sure you can visualize the long-range consequences of such behavior.

Jaeger, CSU: Considering the importance the two signatories attach to the SALT II agreement, consequences affecting Allied security policies are bound to arise.

9478

CSO: 3103

CAPABILITIES, MORALE OF BRITISH ARMY OF THE RHINE DISCUSSED

Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 4 Sep 79 p 3

[Text] Rheindahlen, 3 September. There are two or three things that people know about it: that bombs go off in front of their barracks, among other things, or that the costs of stationing it there are gradually growing beyond the means of the British Government. In the Muensterland or in the Teutoburg region people know besides that in the annual maneuvers in the forest and fields everything in the path of their tanks is crushed flat. Nothing more is known here about the British Army of the Rhine. Asked about the meaning and purpose of the presence of British troops in the FRG, one Bielefeld citizen said: "You can't do anything against them; it's really an occupying power."

The man was 10 years behind the times. Only the official name "British Army of the Rhine" (BAOR) still recalls the former occupiers who were called "British Army of Occupation on the Rhine." Today the British have quite a different assignment in the FRG. A "decisive contribution to the forward defense within the Army Group North of NATO" is expected of the English, Welsh, Scottish and Northern Irish soldiers in the 14 garrisons between Krefeld and Celle. In an emergency they are to try to stop Eastern invasion troops in the North German plain along with Germans, Netherlands, and Belgians. Day to day, however, they have to cope with quite different enemies--boredom, alcohol, and isolation.

Nevertheless it must mean something that, for example, Major Glyn Jones thinks back nostalgically to the time of his posting in Cyprus, when the Greeks and Turks were attacking one another and there was really something for the soldiers in the service of Her Majesty the Queen to do. It is certainly also no coincidence that in recent weeks so many volunteers have been applying to go to some corner of the world "where at least something is going wrong," as one of them put it. He meant Hong Kong and its refugee problem. Finally, the fact that the program director of the BFBS soldier radio sees his main task as strengthening the morale of his listeners leads one to conclude that the British in the FRG have to combat very special problems.

How could it have been otherwise: Young people who enter military service in Great Britain mostly speculate on an exciting job in Cyprus or Malaysia, Singapore, Borneo, or Hong Kong and mostly end up in Paderborn, Detmold, or Verden on the Aller. They come to the German mainland, but their station normally proves to be a British island, where even the toilet paper is stamped "Government Property." There is nothing here which would not have been made in Great Britain: from the schools and hospitals to the film theaters, the stage, and churches and the obligatory Navy Army Air Force Institute: The NAAFI Shop, the department store which,--like the canteen girls of yore--follows the British troops wherever they are engaged.

British garrisons in the FRG are largely autarkic, mostly completely isolated soldier communities--like the "Rheindahlen Garrison," where about 10,000 British, including women and children, live together. Everything is provided: they have their own fire department, six schools, two churches, a medical center, a theater, the "Astra" and "Globe" cinemas, and an educational installation called "Cambridge House" where, as in all the other garrisons as well, they could learn German, if they wished. Very few wish to. For example Corporal Winter has been in the Federal Republic for 6 years and is presently stationed in Rheindahlen with the 86th Squadron of the Royal Corps of Transport and speaks not a word of German.

Barbara Webb, more than 3 years in Germany, has likewise made little progress with the language of the country--why? She gets along quite well in a German supermarket without knowing German, she says, and if she goes out it is to the Officers' Mess in Toenisvorst, where her husband is stationed with the 28th signal regiment. Actually the social life of the British excludes the German public. The meeting places are the "messes"--separated according to rank--where they meet for a couple of drinks, television, dining, or bingo games, and where the contents of the checkroom at the entrance always tells exactly who is there: the green caps with the tassel and swagger stick lying beside it are part of the uniform of the Irish, the dark headgear with a band and red-white pattern indicate their owners as Scots, and the green caps belong to members of the Women's Corps.

The sergeant's mess in Rheindahlen every year is the scene of an "Oktoberfest," where of course there are "Bretzn" and "Leberkaes." And when the season of gaiety comes in the Rhineland, the British also do not like to lag behind: A "Carnival Night" in the dancing bar is a welcome change to the everyday tedium, when the television usually provides the conversation. They can still receive five programs (three German, two Dutch), and if they cannot understand the British or American crime serials dubbed in German, it does not make much difference: They already know the films from Britain. In 1981 they will even be able to receive British television in 7 garrisons.

This extremely dull ghetto life, tied to an assignment which is fulfilled merely by being present, is a really hard fate for young people, who in the beginning--at least many of them--found it "very exciting" to be career

soldiers. It is therefore not a good basis for the morale of the troops, particularly when the frustrated soldiers try to console themselves with cheap--because duty-free-alcohol while the upper ranks try politely, with never flagging zeal and demonstrative examples, to prove their solidarity with the Germans. The mayor and the garrison commander sit in the balcony at the "Royal Military Music Show" in Muenster and delight in the really well done brainwave of having Scots appear in Lederhosen.

What the "Music Show" is for Muenster, the "Horse Show" is for Bielefeld, where in addition a music parade of British military bands is presented every year on the car race track, and on the terrain of Ripon Barracks a "Driver's Day" is held--approachment attempts through expert driving. This is mainly for "fun." Other activities have pedagogical or charitable aspects, like the German-English "Action Clean Landscape" or the appeals to British soldiers to donate to the German Red Cross.

How far one can get with such contact activities the top BAOR commanders think is demonstrated by the fact that the British enjoy the so-called "freedom of the city" in a dozen German towns and communities. In Toenisvorst this means that the 28th signal regiment marches through the streets of the small village on festive occasions with march music, fluttering banners, and presented arms. The friendship is so great that the separate sections of Vorst and St. Toenis jealously see to it that the Tommies march as long in one as in the other.

And they get along with such friendliness and politeness, exchange pleasantries, and assure each other of their mutual esteem. And when a British commander reaches the end of his tour, he is--like Lieutenant-General Sir Roland Gibbs in Bielefeld--of course "very, very sad," and would "far prefer to stay." This all of course helps the ordinary soldiers (the great majority) very little. Brewery tours are continually organized, football games arranged, and students exchanged, but nothing much more happens. Whoever wants to get out of the island of isolation does so on his own initiative--live Chief Clark Frank Line and his wife Eileen in Rheindahlen, who want to see Bavaria's wonders and visit the Oberammergau Passion Play next year.

Some "50 percent of the soldiers regularly go out," estimates Rheindahlen's deputy garrison commander Frank Manning--and clearly must have erred on the high side. Many leave the garrison very rarely, because they know--as Staff Sergeant Catherine Johnson says--"you can spend 100 marks very quickly in Germany." But this is not very compatible with the goal of many Britons of saving a part of their wages--for later, when they leave the service. "Says Corporal Winter: "Then you have absolutely nothing. From knives and forks to pillows--everything belongs to the army."

Added to this is another reason why the British stay in their ghettos. They have not always had the best experiences with "sightseeing tours." In a poll of British soldiers by a Bielefeld newspaper a corporal said "that the people are a bit anti-British." And when students of the upper level college of the Bielefeld University asked members of the Rhine Army about their lives and their contacts with Germans, they got characterizations like these: Germans are often "cool," German pubs are often "impersonal." Generally there are obviously few Germans who want to have anything to do with the soldiers from the island. Once when an appeal went out to invite British to Christmas dinner at home in Bielefeld, just six families responded.

Is it then to be wondered at that a British officer once complained: "We are the half-forgotten army?" Only seldom does a little glitter fall on this army--particularly when a member of the royal house gives it the honor. Prince Philip on his Chieftain tank--that is an event which is outdone only by the appearance of his consort. That is a sensation--and what a one! When the Queen in July 1977 reviewed the hitherto greatest parade of the British forces on the NATO parade ground of Sennelager near Paderborn it was as though East Westphalia had become a monarchy, and the newspapers were not embarrassed to write of the "event of the century."

A day later when the dust over the parade ground had once again settled, everyday life became gray again: the same old boredom, the usual counter-measures, the favorite of which is called "Adventure Training." In any case there is no lack of participants when courses in canoeing, mountain-climbing or skiing in special training camps in the Allgaeu, in Norway, or the Harz are offered--true to the motto which Major Jones formulates and which is less a part of training strategy than an antiboredom campaign: "The boys have to be kept moving all the time; the more training courses, the better."

But still: With such opportunities the Rhine Army men can at least have a fling, which, moreover, they like to do on other occasions as well. The maneuver damages for which the British, famed for their combativity, are notorious, are no wonder with soldiers, of whom a Bundeswehr expert says: "They have a different attitude; for them war and war games are very close together." Even in this field the British are not spared frustrations: Their equipment is deficient, and their Chieftain tank is rated--particularly for German combat terrain--as poorly mobile colossus, and as for their troop strength--that is the subject of the most adventurous speculations.

According to official data the BAOR now has a troop strength of 60,000 soldiers, 3,700 of whom were sent on short notice to Northern Ireland. It is nevertheless believed that in actuality far fewer British soldiers are on German soil. There has been talk of 40,000 and even that for the purpose of dissembling the true troop strength, the lights are left on in garrisons where there are no longer any soldiers, which is, however, energetically denied by official British agencies.

6108

CSO: 3103

CENTER PARTY LEADERS FAVOR LONG ADVANCE LOOK AT SUCCESSORS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 5 Sep 79 p 7

[Article: "Center Party Leadership Wants Discussion of Position"]

[Text] The Center Party leadership is encouraging party members to discuss the party leadership to be elected in Turku at the party congress next summer.

Chairman Johannes Virolainen and Party Secretary Mikko Immonen are demanding that the chairmen and business managers enter into an open discussion of the election of personnel for the Turku congress at the negotiating meetings in Espoo on Monday and Tuesday.

"We should not remain silent about the situation in the Center Party until the last minute," stated Party Secretary Immonen and referred to the change of chairmen in the Conservative Party and the SKDL [Finnish Peoples Democratic League] last spring.

"The changes of personnel which took place in other parties on both the right and the left are a warning example of how we should not proceed if changes in personnel are to be carried out in a democratic manner," stated Immonen.

The election of the SKDL's Kalevi Kivisto as well as the Conservative Party's Ilkka Suominen was preceded by a rather lukewarm discussion.

Party Secretary Immonen told the most important representatives of the party's rank and file that a discussion of the leadership has been avoided in the Center Party. "If anyone presented an idea concerning a change of personnel, it aroused commotion and a series of questions," stated Immonen.

The Center Party is currently seeking positions for the election of individuals at the Party Congress in Turku. Neither Chairman Johannes Virolainen nor the vice chairmen Paavo Vayrynen, Ahti Pekkala, and Marjatta Vaananen have directly indicated their aspirations for the party chairmanship, but are awaiting positions from the party membership.

Party Secretary Mikko Immonen for his part has not yet said that in the fall he will probably take over Nestor Kaasalainen's position as administrative director of Alko.

Immonen has, however, fueled the discussions concerning a successor. The strongest candidates at this time are Finance Minister Pekkala's Political Secretary Seppo Kaariainen and Center Party Organizational Chief Antti Maki-Reinikka.

Vice Chairman Vayrynen, who is considered to be the strongest challenger to Chairman Virolainen, stated last Tuesday night that she will not agree to make any comments at all about the chairmanship question.

Those close to Vayrynen are saying that "she is waiting for signs from the rank and file". The Center Party's Youth Organization is the most enthusiastic promoter of Vayrynen.

Vice Chairman Vaananen has enthusiastically made his rounds within the rank and file of the Center Party. He also has not agreed to admitting his candidacy for the Center Party's chairmanship in Turku.

10576

CSO: 3107

WARTSILA HOPING TO SELL NEW SURFACE SKIMMER TO SOVIETS

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 6 Sep 79 p 24

[Article: "Wartsila as a Pioneer: Surface Skimmer Headed for Export Success"]

[Text] A new type of large surface skimmer [air cushion ship], which is currently being developed at Wartsila's Helsinki Shipyards, is being slated for sales on the international market. It is intended that the first surface skimmer, more than 30 meters long and with a cargo capacity of 17 tons, will be located in Korppoo in the Turku Archipelago. Wartsila intends to export these surface skimmers to the Soviet Union.

The prototype was tested in open waters off the coast of Helsinki on Wednesday. The test was attended by Transportation Minister Veikko Saarto, Road and Water Construction Administration Chief Jouko Loikkanen, and representatives from the Soviet trade mission and the import firm Sudoimport [All-Union Association for the Import of Ships].

The plan is to sign an agreement between TVH [Road and Water Construction Administration] and Wartsila aimed at the procurement of a domestic surface skimmer during September or October.

The surface skimmer will be put into operation in Finland on the Korppoo-Houtskari-Norrskata route in the Turku Archipelago in order to supplement road and ferry transportation especially in the winter and when the roads are impassable.

For the time being there are no resources in Finland for the series production of this vessel.

Under Development for 2 Years

Wartsila, which is known as a builder of icebreakers, has been developing the surface skimmer for a couple years. The vessel is intended for use in Arctic waters.

"We would like to have the surface skimmer partially compensate for the present conventional road ferries," stated Division Chief Eero Makinen of Wartsila.

"We have been developing this ferry in cooperation with TVH partly by means of a production development loan obtained from SITRA.

"Because of the ice conditions, the present traffic on the Korppoo route is in great difficulties. We can bring about a regular and rapid service regardless of ice conditions by means of the surface skimmer."

Successful Tests in Northern Gulf of Bothnia

Prototypes were tested successfully last spring under Arctic conditions in the northern part of the Gulf of Bothnia. So far the construction of the ferry has cost a total of 1.2 million markkas.

"The open sea tests were conducted in the same manner as the tests last Wednesday in Helsinki by pulling the ferry out to sea with the Navy mine ship Keihassalmi," stated Division Chief Makinen.

"In the tests we studied the ferry's fitness for navigation under various conditions, its behavior and response to various instructions, its stability, and other factors relating to safety.

"The results confirmed our previous calculations and the results of test models. On this basis we were able to state that the ferry can serve in place of a conventional highway ferry," states Makinen.

Speed 35 Kilometers Per Hour

Foreign or domestic surface skimmers tested previously in Finland were not suitable for winter conditions.

The vessel which has now been developed differs greatly from its predecessors. The others were manufactured as aircraft to fly at a low level. This new ferry was made as a "ship moving in the air", which is also suitable for navigation on the open sea under winter conditions.

The prototype easily achieved a speed of approximately 20 knots or approximately 35 kilometers per hour. It is possible that it can break through a thickness of ice 20-50 centimeters.

Hovering Height -- 1 Meter

The actual length of the surface skimmer will be 31.2 meters. The vessel is raised on an air cushion by means of diesel motors and it is pushed forward by propeller motors.

Passenger facilities will be located on the side of the vessel and the center will contain an auto deck. The whole structure is primarily made up of aluminum, states Project Director Pentti Heijola.

The hovering height of the test vessel is 1 meter. This makes it possible to move forward over packed ice and reefs. The vessel is able to travel from sea to land without any problem. The speed of the ferry will be 15 knots.

Breaks Ice

Ice is broken in front of the vessel by two means. In the first place the surface skimmer also forces down the water under the ice by the air bubble it creates, at which time air is able to get under the ice. Thus the ice breaks apart from its own weight. The air cushion forces water exactly in the same manner that the normal hull of a ship does. In the second place the air cushion forces the ice into a wave-like motion, the effects of which causes the ice to break up.

Domestic Level High

After the procurement agreement for the surface skimmer is signed, construction will be completed within a year inasmuch as everything goes according to plans.

The vessel will be primarily of domestic composition. Foreign components will probably consist of engines and motors as well as certain electrical devices and guidance systems.

Three different types of surfaces were tested on the prototype: rubberized, PVC-coated, and PUC-coated.

Border Patrol Interested

In addition to the PVH, use of the surface skimmer has been discussed with the Sea Transport Administration and the Border Patrol for transport tasks in coastal areas. The duties of both institutions include patrolling, transportation, and other things. The surface skimmer is more useful and more economical for these tasks than other vessels according to the Sea Transport Administration.

Surface skimmer equipment has been developed in various countries such as England for a couple of decades already. This development work has been primarily directed at high-speed vessels. Cold weather conditions and ice, however, present special requirements, which differ essentially from those requirements which are established for high-speed vessels traveling over water.

Canada and England, among others, have had experience with the use of the surface skimmer. Most recently naval units of the FRG have conducted adaptation tests with a surface skimmer manufactured in England for the purpose of determining the suitability of the vessel in narrow bodies of water.

NEW SURFACE SKIMMER TESTED NEAR HELSINKI

Helsinki DEMARI in Finnish 6 Sep 79 p 1



The prototype of Wartsila's surface skimmer was tested yesterday off the coast of Helsinki. Present at the test were Transportation Minister Veikko Saarto, Chief Director Jouko Loikkanen, and representatives from the Soviet trade mission and the import firm Sudoinport. Photo from DEMARI 6 Sep 79 p 1.

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WARTSILA, SUDOLIMPORT AGREE TO BUILD DIESEL UNITS JOINTLY

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 6 Sep 79 p 14

[Article: "Wartsila and Sudolimport to Cooperate"]

[Text] Wartsila and Sudolimport [All-Union Association for the Import of Ships] have reached an agreement for putting into operation the joint production of a series of diesel units. According to the agreement of cooperation between the firms the Wartsila plants at Vaasa will manufacture four different classes of diesel units with respect to capacity, which will be equipped with Wartsila diesel motors and generators from Leningrad Elektrosila [Electric Power].

In addition to Finnish and Soviet markets, it is estimated that these joint products will have good commercial possibilities in the CEMA area also and elsewhere in third party countries.

This joint production agreement is one of the first agreements in this area. The firms have already begun their joint production and marketing, maintenance, and spare parts services have been organized.

In the first phase the units will be installed in ships to be exported from Finland to the Soviet Union and in ships to be built in the Soviet Union and an attempt will be made to export them to the CEMA area.

The second phase entails the export of these units to countries from which Sudolimports is procuring ships and after that to other countries as well. The goals are not just limited to ship usage, but an attempt will be made to sell the units for stationary usage also.

The TS-diesel motor from Wartsila's Vaasa Plant and the SRF-type generators from Elektrosila will be mounted in the joint ship. A sea registry classification has already been procured from the Soviet Union for the units and the same process is now going on with Lloyds and Norske Veritaks.

The diesel capacities of the units are 300, 630, 800, and 1,000 kilowatts. This joint production is considered to be especially important at Wartsila also for the reason that now for the first time in the firm this type of co-operation exists between Vaasa and Elektrosila at a plant level.

FINNS TO PLAN HARBOR FOR ETHIOPIA

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 6 Sep 79 p 14

[Article: "Finnconsult Corporation Planning Harbor in Ethiopia"]

[Text] The Consolidated Finnish Consulting Offices has concluded an agreement with the government of Ethiopia for the planning of a harbor at Massawa. This consulting agreement worth approximately 4 million markkas is a continuation of the special report made in the years 1977-78 regarding the practical development of a harbor.

According to Managing Director Jukka Rausti of Finnconsult Corporation the agreement now concluded includes basic studies and soundings as well as a detailed operational plan, the plan for a dock and a new warehouse area, and detailed plans for piping and electrification. Also the funding needs of this project will be clarified. Managing Director Rausti estimates that this work will take a full year.

It Is Believed There Will Be New Agreements

It is believed that this agreement will later result in new Finnish projects, the supervision of construction work and the planning of harbor construction, among other things.

The Port of Massawa is the second of Ethiopia's Red Sea ports. It is also the only export and import channel in the northern part of the country. The port has rather old traditions in that it once served as the port of Aksumine, the home port of the Queen of Saaba. The Italians renewed it to its present condition in the 1930's.

Presently the dock is slightly less than 1 kilometer long and in rather poor condition. It will be completely renovated in the near future, states Managing Director Rausti.

Considerable investments will be required to make the harbor fully operational. From the point of view of the living conditions of the population in northern Ethiopia its renovation is, however, necessary, and the government of Ethiopia considers the project to be especially important.

PROBLEMS CONFRONTING RPR REVIEWED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 18-19 Aug 79 p 5

[Article by Patrice-H. Desaubliaux: "The RPR in Search of a Second Wind"]

[Text] Of all political parties, the RPR [Rally for the Republic] is definitely the one which has most scrupulously observed the summer truce this year. Neither Jacques Chirac nor any other official has intervened for a month. At the movement's headquarters on Rue de Lille, there is total calm. The main offices on every floor are empty during this week of 15 August and only the chief of staff of Alain Devaquet, the general secretary, is on duty. It is only during next week that activity will start up again, as Jacques Chirac must return to the capital for the ceremonies marking the 35th anniversary of the Liberation of Paris. As for the RPR chairman's actual return to politics, this will take place, barring unforeseen events, only toward mid-September at the time of the special Central Committee meeting.

More than a month's vacation for Jacques Chirac, that is a real event. It has been at least 13 years since he took that long a vacation: he was a member of the government without interruption from 1967 to 1976. In 1977, we were right in the middle of campaigning for the parliamentary elections and in 1978 we were between the parliamentary and European elections [i.e., the European Community Assembly elections]. There was none of that during this summer of 1979. The absence of elections in 1980, on the other hand, calls for relaxation and reflection.

For both Jacques Chirac and the RPR, everything is proceeding as though the time has come to try to get a second wind. After actively participating in the successful campaign of the majority and the right choice in 1978, Gaullists have just been through a difficult year and they all recognize the need to deepen their doctrine and perfect their strategy. The very kind of upcoming major election--the presidential election of 1981--invites them to do so, but also the place and role of their party within the majority.

To use the expression of Claude Labbe, political adviser and chairman of the parliamentary group, how can the RPR "remain itself while remaining within the majority?" Last year the main criticism expressed within the movement itself concerned precisely this point. Jacques Chirac and his advisers were particularly reproached for attacking the government too vehemently while being obliged to support it in parliament, since there was never any question of implementing "the policy of the worst," i.e., of censuring the government. Of course, any political party has the right to express its positions, which are not necessarily those of the government, but provided that those positions are "coherent and credible," about which men such as Olivier Guichard have doubts. At the Central Committee meeting of 20 June, didn't the former minister state: "We have many excellent ideas, proposals to defend, criticism to express. But we don't have an alternate policy, unless we have several of them."

Two Unresolvable Types of Conduct

"Therefore let us be," Olivier Guichard concluded, "simply and squarely within the majority." We are within the majority, Jacques Chirac and Claude Labbe answered him, but don't ask us to become the fourth component of the UDF [French Democratic Union]. "Within the majority," the former prime minister pointed out to this same Central Committee, "there are two profoundly different types of conduct which are and always will be unresolvable, regardless of what we do."

Thus for Jacques Chirac and his friends, whose main achievement last year was to protect their unity through the storm, the road is narrow. Thus the importance of the special Central Committee meeting scheduled for mid-September. Besides the general policy debate, which will enable them to determine their position after the holidays, particularly economically and socially, three reports will be presented at that meeting which, we should recall, brings together all members of parliament, deputies and senators, and all departmental secretaries.

Alain Devaquet will propose a reform of the movement's structures, intended to strengthen and modernize the staff of the General Secretariat and to improve relations between the movement and the National Assembly parliamentary group.

Andre Fanton, a former minister, had the vacation job of making a study on information in the broad sense, i.e., on the movement's image and dissemination of its political message at the same time.

Coherent Proposals

The third report, the most important in view of the circumstances, was assigned to Jean Meo, Jacques Chirac's economic adviser: its purpose is to give coherence and credibility to the RPR's proposals for dealing with the crisis.

Since 10 June, the date of the European election with poor results for the RPR, Jacques Chirac has revealed nothing of his thoughts and inmost intentions. He has listened a lot and first considered the advice of those who, like Robert Poujade, hoped "that he would be a man of thought, because thought is at the root of truly great actions."

The three reports of Alain Devaquet, Andre Fanton and Jean Meo will enable him to continue in this direction. But he has already warned his friends, particularly those who urged him to step down and make way for a collegial leadership, that he intends "to fully assume" his duties as chairman of the RPR.

And "the time has come" for him to draw conclusions, which he probably believes he has to draw from what he must have heard and read since 10 June, and for him to define the RPR's strategy for the coming months.

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CSO: 3100

MILITARY APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS NOTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Aug 79 p 8

[Text] Army

Promoted: Major general, brigadier generals Georges Longeret, Jacques Merlet, Jacques Saunier and Jean Jarrige; general quartermaster first class, general quartermaster second class Lucien Lacroze; brigadier general, colonels Jean Oulanier, Francois Bichet, Jean Bock, Michel Guillermet, Robert Delbos, Daniel Clediere, Jehan Poudelet, Norbert Molinier, Michel Lartigue and Gilbert Robert.

Air Force

Promoted: To the rank and title of lieutenant general, major general Henri Atlan; major general, brigadier general Pierre Flachard; brigadier general, colonel Francois Mermet.

Ordnance

Promoted: General engineer first class, general engineer second class Max Aucher, appointed chief of the "Test Tank" group of the technical branch of naval ordnance and shipbuilding; general engineer second class, chief engineers Serge Bindel, Jean Boisson and Jacques Delorme.

Appointed: Official representative attached to the inspector of ordnance, general engineer first class Lucien Toche; director of Toulon naval ordnance and shipbuilding, general engineer first class Andre Minvielle; assigned to the director of ordnance research, studies and techniques and to the duties of assistant director of nuclear, biological and chemical defense, general engineer second class Pierre Ricaud; assistant to the chief of central telecommunications and data processing services, general engineer second class Yves Garnier; regional western director of the industrial ordnance supervision service, general engineer second class Roger Roudil.

Health

Promoted: To the rank and privileges of major general with the title of medical inspector general, general medical officer Jean Bastien, appointed director of the Health Services Training School for the Air Force.

Appointed: Technical inspector of army surgical services, medical inspector general Pierre Tournoux; chief physician of the Val-de-Grace army training hospital, general medical officer Jean-Pierre Thomas.

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BRIEFS

STAYER LOSES CONTROL--After conclusion of negotiations begun last March between Stayer-Hellas and ETVA, an increase in capital of 13,907,000 and a redistribution of stock has given Greek interests a controlling share of 68% of this important defense supplier. This was accomplished despite Austrian protests. Greece will benefit in many ways: (1) A fully-operating military industry is obtained which guarantees uniformity of new material and spare parts. In the case of new products, Austrian technology will be fully utilized. (2) An increase in exports to the Middle East of current production. Future exports of petrol motors such as the WD 610 which will be manufactured by Stayer Hellas. Purchase by Stayer (Austria) annually of 2,000 units of these motors for a 5-year period. (3) The Austrians will meet their requirements for armoured vehicles by purchases from Stayer-Hellas. (4) Increased activity will have a strong impact on the 135 Greek by-product manufacturers who rely on Stayer-Hellas for their own development. Orders at an estimated 500 million drachma level will be placed this year, and prospects are excellent. [Text] [Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 1 Sep 79 p 8]

TRADE WITH ISRAEL--A considerable increase was noted in trade transactions between Greece and Israel during the first quarter of this year compared with the same period in 1978. Greek exports to Israel were 111.6 percent higher in the January to March period of 1979 and amounted to 132.7 million drs. Greek imports from Israel also increased, by 90.0 percent, compared with the first quarter of 1978, and amounted to 239.6 million drs. Tobacco and building materials made up the greater part of Greek exports to Israel, while chemicals and metal products, followed by agricultural products and raw materials for the textile industry are the main Greek imports from Israel. With regard to further promoting trade between the two countries, an Israeli official pointed out that the visit of a Greek trade mission to Israel will greatly help to place more Greek products on the Israeli markets. Israelis are constantly increasing their exports to Greece by adding new product lines, the official reported. About 250 Israeli firms are presently represented in Greece. [Text] [Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 1 Sep 79 p 8]

NEW URANIUM DEPOSIT--A new and reportedly important deposit of uranium has been located in the area of Vroutous by IGME and Democritus Center exploration teams operating in the area of Serres. This deposit according to an official statement by the Ministry of Industry, together with a further uranium deposit which was located at Parenesti near Drama, could supply sufficient raw material to feed a nuclear unit for the production of electricity. Referring to the finds, Energy Minister Mr Evert reported that by 1981 or 1982 Greece's uranium deposits will have been properly examined and a fuller picture of their potential will be available. Also on the domestic resources front in a recent TV broadcast, Mr Zahos of the DEP, the government agency involved in the search for oil, reported that petroleum drillings in the Ionian Sea were continuing intensively and would be completed by the end of 1979. [Text] [Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 1 Sep 79 p 8]

CSO: 4920

DUTCH LOSS OF INFLUENCE WITHIN EC ANALYZED

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 4 Aug 79 pp 42-43

[Article by Sig. W. Wolf: "Too Few Dutchmen in Europe's Gilded Cage"]

[Text] The Netherlands is steadily losing more influence within the European Community. Our representation in the European apparatus is crumbling down. Because we are too decent. But also because our young university graduates and civil servants have no desire to fight for a position in Europe's "gilded cage."

"Whenever somebody here in Brussels breaks a leg, the question is immediately asked whether he might also suffer a heart attack. The dropping out of a higher ranking colleague means opportunities for promotion. Then the national mafia within the European apparatus can get to work. Countries with strong personalities at the top have the best prospect of securing the best jobs for their citizens. In terms of pushing their own people, the Netherlands has a great deal to learn from Frenchmen, Italians or Belgians."

This cynical cry from a Dutchman who for years has been moving in the Brussels circuit of European "goldfinches" is symptomatic of the irritation and frustration which has been growing for years within the circles of Dutch European civil servants. With silent resignation they have had to watch the steady crumbling of Dutch influence within the European bastion.

A slump has clearly set in. There are fewer and fewer Dutchmen who push through to the upper ranks of the European fourth power, the caste of European civil servants in the Berlaymont building in Brussels. Minister of Finance Andriessen recently pointed this out to EC Commissioner for Budgetary Affairs Tugendhat when the item "increase of civil servants" came up, during debate on the European Commission's budget.

The Netherlands is heavily underrepresented in the European civil service apparatus. An ever increasing number of services in "Brussels" lack Dutchmen at the top who understand Dutch problems and with whom it would be easy to make contact from the Hague.

The figures do not lie about this. At the present time, there are 8025 civil servants in the European apparatus, 2137 of whom are category A civil servants, the highest ranks. Among these civil servants, 131 are Dutchmen, while based on the existing ratios there should be 220 of them. Expressed in percentages, this means that we have a right to 8 to 9 percent of the positions, but that in reality we do not exceed 3.3 percent. A country such as Belgium has 16.7 percent and the much smaller Luxembourg even scores 2.4 percent. This picture is particularly evident in the structure of the A category, the upper ranks, for which young university graduates are eligible.

The Netherlands itself is largely to blame for the relative underrepresentation of Dutchmen in the Brussels apparatus. Young graduates seem barely interested in a European position. "Incomprehensible," sighed one Dutchman who has a great deal to do within the European Commission with regard to the placing of Dutchmen. "In this period where there is much unemployment among young university graduates one would expect that all opportunities would be seized to find a job. After all, a starting salary of a clear 4000 guilders per month is good pay."

The "gap" in the Dutch representation occurred in 1973 with the entry of Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark into the European Community. At that time a good many positions had to be vacated for the new members. Many Dutchmen in the age bracket of 40 to 50 years of age, grabbed the opportunity to disappear with a golden handshake. Until they reach the age of 65 years they will be able to count on a monthly income of 70 to 80 percent of their last earned salary. After leaving Brussels, they did not go home to twiddle their thumbs. Many of them found a job in the Dutch civil service or in industry. Now they can exist on a royal double income.

However, the mass departure left a bitter aftertaste in Brussels. As a result of the large exodus, the European apparatus derailed. Many expert civil servants had deserted the Brussels scene. The word in the European Commission now is: "We will never again have such a drastic 'golden exodus.'"

Following the mass departure of dozens of their countrymen, Dutchmen to fill the vacancies failed to materialize. It is significant that when 2 years ago a call went out for lawyers from all the member states, 800 candidates applied, only 40 of which were Dutchmen.

The main reason for the minimal interest is the competitive examination each candidate who wants to enter the European service has to submit to. A written and oral competitive examination is followed by a psychological test. When the finishing line has been reached, those who succeeded are peddled about in the various departments. The national "mafias" see to it that their countrymen land in the jobs with best promotion potential. This is a time consuming and discouraging procedure. Dutch graduates are not very anxious to throw themselves in this selection adventure. They have just left the university benches and would again have to participate in an examination. With a good chance that they might not succeed anyhow. They are in no great hurry to take the trouble.

And in the other reserve of Dutch candidates, the civil service world, the inclination to enter into the European service is not particularly great either. This is related to the seconding rule which does not seem attractive enough to the Dutch civil servant.

But even if taking the step to Brussels were to be made attractive to Dutchmen, there still remains the question of whether the Netherlands would get its share. In the meantime, in Brussels they have also recognized that we would be willing to go down with our dignity. Our behavior is too irroachable and we are burdened by the fact that we see the European Commission as an unimpeachable a-political apparatus. We are too proper and are not at all inclined to give national politics a decisive role in terms of decision making and appointments. While within the Brussels circuit it is clearly considered a recommendation when one recognizes national political interests as the sole criterion for so-called European thinking.

The only time that we dare to jump rather high in the saddle politically speaking is for the nomination of a European commissioner. But once we have achieved our goal, the urge to carry politics further is not very great. We are not political animals. Especially not at the top of the European structure. The only Dutchman who was an exception to this rule was Commissioner for Agriculture Lardinois. He did not allow Dutch interests to be pushed into the background.

The pains of neutral behavior have also been palpably brought home to the top of the European apparatus. There are only three Dutchmen at the level of director general as against six Belgians, for example. The Netherlands is entitled to a fourth seat. A Dutch candidate has already been pushed forward and been approved by the relevant commissioner. But due to the squabbling over the problems of nationality, the candidate has not been appointed yet.

When, in 1980 and 1981, Greece and Spain join the European Community, there will be little chance that the Netherlands will still get its fourth rightful seat. One must fear that there will not be anything at all left for us to get at that time.

The fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult for Dutchmen to push through to the European top is evidenced by the filling of the position of secretary general of the European Parliament. Since 1951, the position has been held by a Dutchman, Hans Nord, who was recently elected to the European Parliament, as a member of the VVD (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy). Consequently, he had to resign as secretary general. In spite of a great deal of pressure by Dutch members of parliament to produce a candidate, nobody had been proposed yet. The story is that the Dutch members of parliament have been unable to find a suitable person for this job. But the tale which is increasingly heard in the Strasbourg lobbies is that the Dutch members of parliament begrudge each other the job and therefore simply let the matter ride. It is expected that the European Parliament will shortly make its choice between Nord's replacement, German

Director General Opitz, and the Flemish former member of parliament De Wulf, who did not win in last June's European elections and for whom a suitable job must be found.

The big blow for the Netherlands will probably occur next year when the president of the European Commission, the Englishman Jenkins, retires. Following a German, a Belgian, a Frenchman and an Englishman, it will once again be the turn of a small country to provide a president.

The appointment of a Commission president is first of all a task for the European Parliament. Consequently, some passionate lobbying has already been taking place in that parliament. The Danes pushed their candidate, Commissioner for Agriculture Gundelach, forward, the Luxembourgers produced Deputy Prime Minister Gaston Thorn and Ireland put forward Minister of Foreign Affairs Fitzgerald. It appears that Thorn stands the best chance. He is highly regarded in European circles and is known as a terrier who has proven, for example, that he is well equipped to give French President Giscard d'Estaing a good run for his money.

The Netherlands is still putting off the nomination of a candidate. High on Prime Minister Van Agt's list is former Prime Minister Barend Biesheuvel, followed by the president of the Bank of the Netherlands, Jelle Zijlstra, the minister of development aid, Jan de Koning, and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Norbert Schmelzer. The Netherlands will have to hurry up with its nomination, because in September the debate about Jenkins' succession will begin in the European Parliament. It is feared in Brussels that if we linger any longer before introducing our man, we will enter the ship the same way we did a few years ago when a commissioner for agriculture had to be appointed. Vredeling was nominated only one month before the appointment was to take effect. But by then, the shrewd President Jenkins had already distributed his major posts, including that of commissioner of agriculture. At that time we had to be satisfied with the position of commissioner for social affairs.

We have evidently not learned our lesson yet. We are not skilful enough to determine a timely strategy when it involves getting our people to the European top. And, consequently, we are also in danger of missing the boat more and more often.

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CSO: 3105

VAN DEN BERG RIDS PVDA OF SOCIALIST DISSIDENTS

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 1 Sep 79 pp 17-21

[Article by Kene de Bok: "The Groningen Expulsions: The Advance of Maxism"; passages in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] PvdA [Labor Party] Chairman Max Van den Berg reveals his strategy in the very swift political liquidation of three socialist dissidents in the Groningen Provincial States. Undauntedly he gets even with undisciplined party associates. The strong foundation on which their expulsion is based seems unpleasant to the Groningen members of the provincial states. The Groningen incident shows that the attempt of the members of the provincial states to launch a discussion on internal party democracy within the PvdA has broken down miserably.

Max Van den Berg's influence, as former alderman in the leftist program council which was unshakably in the saddle until the provincial states elections of march 1978, extended far beyond the Groningen city boundaries. His name was linked to the majority strategy; he was the architect of the /Groningen model/ which created a national sensation. As the rising star of a new socialist generation he used his influence at the provincial level also. At the time of the forming of the Council of Provincial Representatives of Groningen he was active behind the scenes. Max van den Berg's manipulations not only created the Groningen model, but also an excess of tensions in the Groningen region of the PvdA.

The problems surfaced when in June 1978 three members of the provincial states frustrated the forming of a progressive majority council in the province of Groningen. With it the program council, the main issue of the elections of March 1978, was shelved. The three dissidents, Mrs Martens and Messrs Tanninga and Brouwer, separated from their party associates and from then on called themselves /the VPS [Alarmed PvdA Socialists]/. In harsh contrast with the party line, they supported the forming of a council in which the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal], VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] and the Alarmed PvdA Socialists were seated. Mrs Martens did not even have scruples about sitting on that

council as a representative. With that the threesome violated the firm agreements, it failed the PvdA for 4 long years and committed an obvious form of treason: treason which cannot be explained away by even the most sympathetic commentator.

Moreover, the way of acting of the three dissidents showed a perplexing lack of tactical-strategic insight into the political matter. By their action they furnished Max van den Berg with a handful of arguments to get even with his enemies from the Groningen provincial administration rapidly and ruthlessly. A striking example of a missed opportunity, because the dissatisfaction and the anxiety of the threesome did have some basis of reasonableness. They saw the maneuvering hand of Max van den Berg in the preparation of a new leftist program council. In principle they, /the gang of three/ as Max van den Berg had called the dissidents, were not opposed to the forming of a new progressive council. They were of the opinion, however, that the combination of individuals and portfolios, as proposed, harmed the provincial administration of Groningen on the points of work opportunity, environment and too high an evaluation of the city of Groningen as against the province. The threesome had serious objections against the return of former delegate Luit Boer, charged with land use planning. Concern was shown about the fact that Boer had always proved to be a willing pawn in Max van den Berg's chess game. The tensions in the PvdA Groningen region did not lead to a discussion which did justice to the minority standpoint of the /gang of three/. The result was that the three went their own way and couldn't care less about the harm of the PvdA region and the socialist group in the provincial states.

The standpoints of the three and the PvdA region of Groningen have grown apart more and more in the past year. Initially the PvdA region wanted a compromise, although the term compromise does not seem to be completely appropriate for the ultimatum by which the PvdA region wanted to force the threesome into the track of party discipline again: Mrs Martens had to withdraw as a representative and the dissidents no longer were allowed to lend support to the sitting CDA-VVD administration. The ultimatum could not be carried out without considerable loss of prestige of the three seceded PvdA members, and the three definitely refused. Meanwhile, the result of the internal stirrings within the Groningen PvdA is that the provincial administration lacks any elbow room. The coalition of confessionals, liberals and those alarmed has a majority of only one vote. The leftist parties act as one opposition block. Added to the political attitude of the Alarmed PvdA Socialists -- the PvdA election platform is strictly adhered to -- this means that only marginal proposals acquire a majority in the provincial administration. In short, it is a situation in which politics is showing its worst side.

The three dissidents point an accusing finger at PvdA Chairman Max van den Berg: "his power thinking" and "his arrogance of power" are the driving forces behind the expulsion. The pointing of this accusing finger at the party chairman seems a superfluous, somewhat theatrical gesture.

Max van den Berg has seldom made a secret of his way of thinking, sprung from power politics, even at the start of his chairmanship. The fact that Max van den Berg considered the attitude of the Groningen three as completely incompatible with his political orientation, is obvious. The fact that the party administration, inspired by Van den Berg, has disassociated itself from the advice of the expulsion committee not to go through with the exclusion of the three, is also in line with expectations.

An important aspect of the Groningen incident is the significance of the conflict as a *testcase* for the political stamina of Max van den Berg. Since Van den Berg's appearance on the horizon, the climate within the PvdA has had a raw character. Various socialists, such as the former Groningen Alderman Wim Hendriks, found the way out. In Amsterdam Irene Verrink was shunted to a sidetrack, in spite of the soothing denials of PvdA parliamentary group Chairman Pelle Mug. The Groningen expulsion is a new demonstration of power which evokes tensions. One of the members of the expulsion committee, Alderman Beyerd from Delfzijl, characterized the expulsion of the three Groningen dissidents as a "medieval punishment," /"In earlier times this type of person was burned, now he is expelled."/

Beyerd analyzed the expulsion of the three "as a warning of the party administration to all representatives at any level of the party hierarchy not to walk out on step with party discipline, under penalty of exclusion." The expulsion of the three has to serve as a deterrent example. The former party administration did not cling to the principle of the monolithic party line. Led by Joop den Uyl, voices were heard which pleaded for a pluriform decision-forming process in the PvdA. Max van den Berg wants to return as soon as possible from the /labor parties/ to the /Labor Party/. Absolute discipline is one of the catchwords of Van den Berg's political handbook. The former party administration decided, partly on Joop den Uyl's insistence, not to force the issue of the expulsion procedure of the Groningen three. Max van den Berg has abandoned that policy line of Den Uyl and his people. If he succeeds in forcing through his centralist party strategy without causing excessive crises, the Den Uyl pluralist tendency appears to be on the retreat.

There seems to be little hope for the three naive ones from Groningen. A professional commission, composed of Mr Jaap Burger, Dr H. Verwey-Jonker and Tim Pauka, in the coming months will deliberate the question of whether the party administration has pronounced the political death sentence on the dissidents justly. Of the three members, for that matter, organization expert Tim Pauka is known as a Max van den Berg-/adept/.

Van den Berg's rapid rise in the PvdA top administration is not in the least surprising. It is surprising, however, that /Maxism/ degenerates so rapidly into a selection doctrine within socialist ranks.

MOLUCCANS CONSIDER ADVISORY COMMITTEE BOYCOTT

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 25 Aug 79 pp 27-29

[Article by Coen van Harten: "Division, but Unanimous Decision: Moluccans Foresee Wiegel Boycott"]

[Text] Manusama recognizes the existence of a generation gap within the Moluccan community. There is a division. But the opinion that [Vice Prime Minister] Wiegel's plan for a Moluccan advisory committee must be rejected is unanimous. The exiles themselves want to establish a Council of Moluccans. If Wiegel does not withdraw his preliminary bill, he can count on a boycott. And that will cause him -- as coordinating minister of Moluccan Affairs -- serious problems.

"The congress of the Badan Persatuan cannot be seen as a meeting of the Moluccan Parliament. The RMS [South Moluccan Republic] Government is in exile and does not have a parliament any more than does the Dutch Government in London," says RMS President J. A. Manusama. The democracy within the RMS is a very special one. Last weekend's Badan Persatuan congress in Wierden thus does not constitute a direct reflection of what takes place in the Moluccan democracy.

Manusama's announcement on the generation gap was practically the only symptom of the division in Moluccan circles: "I do not deny that a gap exists between older and younger people, but such a gap exists also in the Dutch society. It has not led to a change of course with us." But due to the "double" character of the RMS democracy, the voices of the dissident youths whom Manusama alluded to were lacking at the congress.

The translation of Badan Persatuan as "united body" is not for nothing. Decisions are made by electors delegated on behalf of the district councils. The members of the district councils (who in their turn are again addressed as district council) usually are "uncles," aged KNIL [Royal Dutch Indian Army] veterans. They are highly respected in the districts. Also by the youth. Knowledgeable policemen know that and they turn to arrest within the district only in consultation with the district council, in which case

the arrest normally proceeds without problems. But the regional council of the oldest, as the Badan Persatuan can easily be called, is regarded by the youth with the greatest reserve. They realize that the association does not represent them. Only few young people serve on the district councils. An exception is district council member C. Kisanasu from Bovensmilde who just recently "accompanied" a police house search, after which rumors circulated as if on that occasion plans had been discovered for the abduction of [Prime Minister] Van Agt. Bovensmilde itself is already an exception. The district council of Bovensmilde had not delegated any electors and that could be taken as a motion of no-confidence. The district council of Assen had not got around to appointing electors due to organizational difficulties. That had a lot to do with the controversy around the Reverend Samuel Metiari. Dissatisfaction with the local preacher, who plays a prominent role nationally, culminated during the actions in the school and the train 2 years ago.

In 1962 Metiari found an opportunity to bring the various Moluccan organizations together within the then established Badan Persatuan, of which he has been chairman uninterruptedly since that time. The emotional, eloquent speaker developed himself into a charismatic leader. He became the personification of unity. Due to his office, he enjoyed the trust of the elderly, and he became the bulwark of the youth because of his militant attitude. He whole-heartedly cooperated with attempts toward rapprochement with Vietnam by some youths. Manusama watched that with considerable scepticism. A conflict threatened to arise between the two most important Moluccan leaders, in which the youth sided with Metiari, in the hope of further radicalization. But ultimately, during the most recent actions, Metiari resigned himself to Manusama's views. That led to a serious crisis of confidence between Metiari and the young generation.

The latter which Metiari drew up 2 months ago for the congress must be read against that background. He no longer made himself available for a new term of office: "The people must choose who shall be chairman." The overwhelming majority by which the congress nevertheless elected him chairman was a surprise for no one. Certainly not for Metiari. But the latter had accentuated his authority by this move.

The older generation strives toward unity. The Badan Persatuan will attract drifting, non-paying members and give every support to a streamlining of the youth organizations. The youths are searching for unity just as passionately. Just like the elders, they deem the time of strong action to be passed. Only in small, non-organized groups, which exist at the edge of society, is thought still being given to strong action. The majority wants tranquility on that front, only then can unity come into being.

The two large youth groups, Iktis Apikani's Pemuda Masyarakat (the most loyal to Manusama and his associates) and the Susunan Padat Pemuda (which is more critical with regard to the local Moluccan authority), together are trying to increase the degree of organization of the youth. The Golada group, founded 1 year ago, isolates itself completely from the oldsters and therefore

is deemed to a sectarian scope. And the Gerakan Pattimura of the Nijmegen Sociologist Dr Elias Rinsampessy appeals to only a small group due to its intellectualism. This movement, which does not think in terms of an RMS, has lost considerable following by calling the RMS and Dr Chris Soumokil "colonial products." An academic- or extreme approach does not appear to lead to unity. The fact that the undogmatic monthly publication TJENGKEH (a publication which serves as a platform) reaches practically all Moluccan youths proves that the pursued unity is indeed possible.

The RMS leadership is calmly awaiting the re-grouping of the youths. Only then can the Manusama government attune its policy to the younger generation.

Meanwhile, with Manusama's approval, the Badan Persatuan is developing initiatives which have the approval of youths as well as oldsters. It is clear that the RMS leadership no longer sees much use in a political discussion with the Dutch Government. The Badan Persatuan congress broke with a long tradition; no motion was adopted in which the Dutch Government was required to recognize the South Moluccan right of selfdetermination. The RMS now is trying to get its political justice through an international lobby. "Internationalization" of the struggle received unanimous approval. Now there are contacts with other "threatened peoples" and that was something in which the RMS leadership did not see much advantage until recently. But since the "dialogue" with the Dutch Government has been practically broken off, the leaders are looking abroad.

The RMS will take a hard line in the contacts remaining with the Dutch Government. Where necessary, the South Moluccan organizations will cooperate with other minorities, such as Surinamers. Where necessary -- for although Vice Chairman Dr Rits Mual from the Badan Persatuan admits that there are similarities between the problems of Moluccans and, for example, Surinamers -- he is of the opinion that the political aspect of the Moluccan problem necessitates separate provisions. Moreover he has no interest at all in a division of the Dutch population into a majority and minorities.

Mual is chairman of the Public Forum for the Welfare of Moluccans (IWM) and although a preliminary bill by Minister Wiegel provides for the dissolution of the IWM, he will indeed remain chairman for the time being. Thus decided the Badan Persatuan congress. Wiegel wants an advisory committee, 20 percent of whose members are appointed on his recommendation. If that committee comes into being, the Badan Persatuan will boycott it. And that will cause serious problems for Wiegel, coordinating minister of Moluccan Affairs. The Badan Persatuan decided that the IWM (which can indeed count on considerable Moluccan trust) must be reshaped into an advisory council, the Council of Moluccans. Wiegel's reaction will determine the Moluccans/Government relationship.

BRIEFS

PVDA'S VAN DEN BERG PLANS CUBA VISIT--Cuba--PvdA Chairman Max van den Berg, only just returned from a visit to Nicaragua, is already making plans again for a new Latin American trip. With a small party of friends he will make a trip to Cuba, probably in January. There he wants to study education, agriculture and housing. In Nicaragua the party chairman could hardly be distinguished from a Sandinist leader; in Cuba some resemblance with Fidel Castro will be noticed. But no meeting has been arranged between the bearded leaders, for it is a matter of a private visit. "If in Cuba I come into contact with administrators, it will be purely coincidental." [Text] [Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 25 Aug 79 p 125]

CSO: 3104

GARAICOECHEA INTERVIEWED, REJECTS FUTURE INDEPENDENCE

Paris LE FIGARO in French 17 Aug 79 p 4

[Interview With Carlos Garaicoechea, future president of the provisional Basque Government, by Philippe Nourry: "The ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Party] Is Fated To Lose the Support of the People]

[Text] The agreement on the statute of Basque autonomy was signed last 18 July, after 15 days of difficult but fruitful negotiations. This achievement was due to a great extent to the meeting of two individuals who wanted to agree, and who were evidently meant to understand and appreciate one another. One was Mr Suarez himself, prime minister of the Spanish Government; the other was Mr Garaicoechea, president of the /Basque Nationalist Party/ [italics] and of the General Council of Euzkadi.

Thus it happens that a friendly feeling passing between two men of the same generation and with the same upbringing gives history the push needed to make it move forward.

For a long time the leaders of the old Basque Nationalist Party, founded during the last century by rather conservative Catholics, were building a reputation for somewhat dramatic intransigence. A long-standing attitude of mistrust, though justified, toward the central administration, guided their behavior and emphasized their doctrinaire side. Carlos Garaicoechea, 40-year-old sportsman, as attractive as his distinguished challenger from Madrid, resolutely breaks with this image inherited from a Spain that no longer exists. Without repudiating any part of the tradition of the party within which he has been a militant for the past 15 years, when he recently succeeded to the leadership of the executive branch he was able to modify its image considerably, making it younger and transforming into dynamic and realistic objectives the paralyzing indecision characteristic of its attitude, and which caused it to lose ground to political parties of the /"abertzale"/ [italics] left close to ETA.

The PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) was expecting a new man, an "after civil war" man; it found him, as Spain had found one in Adolfo Suarez, in the person of a young Navarrian lawyer of modest background (as is Suarez), who will become head of the provisional Basque government in October before becoming, perhaps, the new *"Pendakari"* of the three historical provinces. Following the referendum which should ratify the statute of autonomy in October, and after the elections of a Basque parliament, he would become the successor of the symbolic president of Euzkadi, Mr Leizaola who, moreover, is expected to return shortly to the Basque Provinces after 30 years in exile.

Interview in Zumaia, a beach near Saint-Sebastian, on the balcony of the apartment where Mr Garaicoechea is vacationing for a few days.

[Question] Last year your party refused to approve a constitution that recognized the existence of "nationalities" within Spain, and accepted the consequences of the refusal. What new factor influenced the PNV to support the statute of autonomy?

[Answer] In essence, it was Madrid's recognition of our people's fundamental historical right to be involved in its destiny. We were kept back by this question of principle. Today, the "statute of Guernica" recognizes that acceptance of a system of autonomy does not imply that the Basque people give up any rights which are historically theirs, and which can be worked out in agreement with what the judicial system of the nation will establish. This means that a constitutional mechanism exists. Therefore, the statute discreetly eliminates the doctrinal obstacles which separate us, at the same time giving reasonable power to our autonomy.

[Question] The PNV has often been accused of going out of its way to be ambiguous as to its real intentions regarding the future of autonomy or independence in the Basque provinces, as well as in its attitude toward the partisans of violence.

[Answer] If there was ambiguity regarding the first point, it came from Madrid which, from the start, did not accept our propositions to define clearly the respective jurisdictions of the central government and of our party. We have always made our position perfectly clear on the necessity for recognition of our historical rights. For us, it was a most important prerequisite and a test of the willingness of the central government to open the doors.

The End of Manicheism

[Question] Does this mean that you basically remain an Independent?

[Answer] That is not stating the problem correctly. We are Basque nationalists, and we believe in the Basque nation. For our people to be able to develop, we also believe that systems other than independence exist. For example,

there can be solutions that contain the spirit of federalism which, after all, would only be an actualization of the system of monarchistic confederation that has prevailed in Spain for a long time. Afterwards, the Manichean spirit appeared and classed as separatists all those who did not accept centralizing Jacobinism. We had to get rid of this absurd attitude.

[Question] What do you feel is the "big step" you have taken?

[Answer] That of having accepted a system of government compatible with the existence of Basque sovereignty from a central power which, for a long time, treated us as separatists, hence as enemies.

[Question] How do you judge ETA's action today?

[Answer] I would like to be objective and not underestimate its historical contribution to the struggle of the Basque people. But ETA has always been a double-edged sword, and it made our task extremely difficult by pursuing its terrorist activities at the very moment when negotiations are in progress.

[Question] You personally have strongly condemned ETA's latest acts of violence. What will be your attitude when a Basque government will be in charge of law and order in Euzkadi?

[Answer] I can assure you that, because it is its duty, this Basque government will assume, without hesitation, all responsibility incumbent upon it. But, in a country where violence has become a habit, it is difficult to foresee any rapid change in the situation. The Basque people are the ones who will take the real initiative for pacification by taking away the oxygen from the groups tempted to perpetuate this violence. The survival of ETA is due to a great extent to the support it gets from those who do not yet believe that real autonomy will be established. If in Madrid the game is played honestly and fairly, without reservations or rearguard battles, and if power is given us soon, then today's skeptics will hand in their notices to ETA themselves.

Peace of the Braves

[Question] Then are you considering a sort of an appeal for a "peace of the braves?"

[Answer] Yes, but the guns must fall silent. Unfortunately, for the moment, there is nothing to negotiate about with the organization that only thinks of continuing the armed struggle. At present, to speak of the "peace of the braves" is like speaking of the sex of the angels!

[Question] Does this stubbornness show that the military ETA is the tool of interests that go far beyond what is at stake for the Basques?

[Answer] One can obviously find everything in ETA: from pure nationalists to impenitent revolutionary internationalists. In any case, the hypothesis of how ETA is manipulated is a problem which should be considered and analyzed, and which I take seriously.

[Question] A final question: One of the arguments for ETA's rejection of the statute is that, at present, it does not include Navarre as part of Euzkadi. What do you think of this, being a Navarrian Basque yourself?

[Answer] ETA has certainly a strange conception of democracy. As you know, the Navarrian people will be consulted. As for me, I believe that sooner or later, when the constitution makes it possible, Navarre will join us. In any case, it is up to the Navarrian people to decide its future, and it is not up to ETA. The only thing we ourselves would not accept is a possible geographical partition of Navarre.

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CSO: 1100

'GUNAYDIN' LOOKS AT PARTIES' PROSPECTS FOR ELECTIONS

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 8, 9, 10, 13, 14 Aug 79

[Article by Husamettin Celebi]

[8 Aug 75, p 7]

[Text] Preparations for the election to choose one-third of the senate and for the National Assembly by-election, which will be held 14 October, are having more and more of an effect on daily life. Along with their calculations, parties' hopes in these elections, their slogans, and their tactics are becoming more evident with every passing day.

We, too, will, in several articles, take up the topic of these elections. We will examine how votes in the provinces in which there will be senate-seat vacancies and in which there will be a National Assembly by-election were distributed in the 1977 election; the strength in these provinces of the parties that have parliamentary groups in particular; how developments that have taken place since 1977 can affect the 14 October election; and the effect the outcome of the election can have on our political life.

According to a study we conducted that was based on State Statistical Institute publications, there were, in 1977, 7.5 million registered voters in the provinces in which senate seats are to be filled. Of these voters, 6,445,000 cast votes, and 5,250,000 ballots were considered valid. The valid votes were distributed as follows among the parties with groups in the National Assembly today:

RPP [Republican People's Party] :	2,200,000
JP [Justice Party] :	1,870,000
NSP [National Salvation Party] :	465,000
NAP [National Action Party] :	275,000

The RPP received the most votes over the JP, its chief rival, in Istanbul. More than 1,530,000 votes were considered valid in this large city of ours. The RPP received 58.2 percent, 891,000 votes. The difference between the RPP and the JP was 50,000 votes. The JP obtained 28.4 percent of the vote.

The JP's greatest victory over the RPP took place in the former's "Kutahya stronghold," which has not been breached for many, many years. The JP received close to 117,500 of the 192,000 valid votes. This constituted 61 percent of the valid ballots. The difference in the number of votes obtained by the JP and the RPP was 73,000 votes, and the RPP's share was 23 percent.

Examining the situations of the parties outside these two provinces, we can summarize our observations as follows:

The RPP collected 55.1 percent of the valid votes in Hatay; the JP, 28.6 percent. The RPP received 52.9 percent of the vote in Kars (the JP, 18.6 percent); 45.4 percent in Erzincan; 45.2 percent in Amasya; and 42.2 percent in Tokat.

The JP obtained 54.1 percent of the ballots in Antalya (the RPP, 34.2 percent). The JP's totals were 51.7 percent in Balikesir (the RPP, 37.4 percent); 50.2 percent in Canakkale (the RPP, 38.7 percent); and 50.2 percent in Mugla (the RPP, 42.5 percent). In addition, the JP attained visible superiority in the provinces of Rize, Samsun, Burdur, and Erzurum.

The NSP, on the other hand, obtained the greatest number of votes of all parties in the provinces of Mardin (23.2 percent) and Van. However, the difference between the NSP and the RPP, which came in second, was 2,000 votes. In Mardin, a large proportion of the votes went to independents.

There were no provinces in which the NAP received a majority of the votes or emerged from the elections as the leading party.

In the meantime, it was seen that independents received, among the provinces in which senate elections will be held in October, 42 percent of the vote in Agri and 46 percent in Mus.

There is no doubt that the Turkey of today is not the same as the Turkey of June 1977. The "man of hope" who obtained a large percentage of the valid votes in the large cities in 1977 has sat in the prime minister's seat for 2 years and says that he has been successful. In contrast, there are opposition parties that claim that not a single success has been able to be demonstrated during these 2 years. The voting public has seen what has taken place, has lived through it all, and is in the process of making evaluations.

In the next column, we will examine, in the light of this situation, what the various parties can expect to happen in this election.

[9 Aug 79, p 7]

[Text] There is no direct relationship between the existence and continuation of the government and the election to fill a third of the senate seats

that will be held in October. However, the fragile mathematical balance in parliament has made this election very important. From what can be determined at this time, the "atmosphere" that emerges as a result of this election will have a wide-ranging effect on our current and future political life as well as on the government.

We wish to examine the situation by beginning with the NAP, which is the party with the smallest group in the National Assembly.

Today, the NAP has a single senator, and his term is about to expire. Can this senator, who went over to the NAP after having been elected as a JP member, be reelected in his district? We will be able to determine the answer to this question by looking at the characteristics of this district.

This election will take place in Kutahya. Kutahya has favored the DP [Democratic Party] and the JP since 1946. Only the former CKMP [Republican Peasants Nation Party] was able to defeat other parties here -- among them, the JP -- and only in 1961. Kutahya, however, again gave its votes to the JP in subsequent elections. In the 1977 assembly deputies' election, the JP received 117,500 votes (61 percent) and was followed by the RPP with 44,827 votes (23 percent). Despite the presence of a senator, who had come over from the JP, the NAP obtained only 9,000 votes (4.9 percent). There are no indications that point to a change in the results of the October election such that the NAP or the RPP position will improve and the JP will be harmed.

One can speak of the not-very-likely prospect of the NAP winning in Yozgat, Erzurum, and Istanbul or of the possibility of its coming close to victory in these provinces. However, a great number of conditions -- difficult ones to accomplish -- must be met in order to do so.

The RPP obtained 49,000 votes (31 percent) in Yozgat in 1977; the JP, 48,000 votes (29 percent); and the NAP, 37,000 votes (23 percent).

In Erzurum, the JP won 107,000 votes (43 percent); the RPP, 54,000 votes (21.7 percent); the NSP, 48,000 votes (15.5 percent); and the NAP, 2,000 votes (13 percent). It is widely claimed that the NSP has lost its support in this province and that the NAP is taking its place.

In Istanbul, the RPP earned 891,000 votes (58 percent); the JP, 434,000 votes (28.5 percent); the NSP, 101,000 votes; and the NAP, 41,000 votes (close to 3 percent).

As can be seen, NAP votes bear a specific, fleeting weight in deputy elections in these provinces. However, because this weight is inadequate to produce results in senate elections, the only way the NAP can become victorious is for JP candidates to be unqualified; NAP candidates, in contrast, to be extremely powerful; and a large number of RPP supporters to refrain from going to the polls as is being predicted.

Despite all this, it is understood that NAP administrators will give their all in this election. The goal of the NAP, since the 1967 election, has been to protect its image of "a growing party." At the very least, it does not want to project an image of "a declining party." Furthermore, NAP officials expect, from the forthcoming election, "a result that will ensure that there will be no backing off from the intensified pressure it has imposed and the dreaded actions it has undertaken over the past 2 years." According to these officials' judgments, results from this election approaching 1977 figures will demonstrate that the NAP, despite everything, is standing on its own two feet and will remain so. This is very important for the NAP.

Can these expectations be met? Or will the JP's slogan, "Be Saved from Leftism," have its desired effect, and will NAP votes tend to be added to the JP's? There are reasons to believe that either could become true. Which possibility is more likely will become more clear as the election grows closer.

Note: Several readers who telephoned yesterday morning stated, "You did Isparta an injustice. The JP's largest victory was in Isparta." What they said is true, and Isparta is Demirel's election district. We note that, in 1977, the JP won close to 70 percent of the valid votes in Isparta (the RPP, 21 percent).

Furthermore, it was written in yesterday's article that the RPP received 90,000 more votes in Istanbul than the JP. The difference was 450,000. We correct this telex error.

[10 Aug 79, p 7]

[Text] The NSP, which ranks third among parties with National Assembly groups, has, at present, six elected senators. Of these, three are about to complete their terms of office.

They are Lutfi Dogan from Erzurum, former religious affairs chairman; Suleyman Ergin from Yozgat; and Ali Oguz from Istanbul.

These senators entered the senate in 1973, the second time the NSP took part in elections and when 48 deputies surprisingly won seats. In order to justify the conclusion we will reach, it is necessary to examine the votes and percentages of votes received in these provinces in 1973 by the NSP:

	Assembly Election	Senate Election
Erzurum	51,513 (29.5 %)	59,475 (31.4 %)
Yozgat	27,767 (21.5 %)	28,516 (22.2 %)
Istanbul	85,454 (8.4 %)	86,856 (8.5 %)

Between 1973 and 1977, the NSP was a partner in the government twice, and it was a government partner in 1977 when the elections were held. Despite

this, it lost votes in Erzurum and Yozgat. Its votes in Erzurum fell to 18,678 votes, 15.5 percent. In Yozgat, it received only 21,347 votes, 13 percent. When the NSP declined in Erzurum, the JP grew. The JP's 44,000 votes in 1973 rose to 107,000 votes in 1977. Likewise, the NAP's 6,000 votes in 1973 became 32,000 votes in 1977. It is widely claimed that the NSP's loss of votes in Erzurum has continued since 1977. In Yozgat, which will elect two senators, the NSP is essentially in fourth place among the parties.

In contrast, the NSP grew in Istanbul between 1973 and 1977, and its number of votes rose by 20,000. In 1977, it obtained 101,000 votes. In 1973, the NSP emerged with one senator with 86,000 votes in Istanbul, in which the JP obtained 297,000 votes and the RPP, 507,000 votes. If the 1977 election results are repeated in October, the NSP will be able to obtain one of Istanbul's ten senate seats. If there is an increase in JP votes and a decrease in RPP votes, the NSP may be left out this time.

On another hand, it is very possible that the NSP will take one of the two senate seats in the province of Mardin, in which it secured 42,751 votes in 1977. In 1977, the JP obtained 30,000 votes and the RPP, 33,000 votes in Mardin. As for the independents, they collected 56,000 votes. One deputy who won as a JP member is now a member of the government and an RPP supporter. Taking into consideration the fact that a deputy who won as an independent is a former RPP member, it can easily be predicted that the second Mardin senate seat will go to the RPP.

When evaluating the NSP's situation in the senate election, the province of Mus, which sent an independent to the senate in 1973 and which gave 39,000 votes to independent candidates in 1977, must not be overlooked. In this province, the NSP is the second party, following very closely behind the JP. If the chances of 1973 independent victor Senator Ismail Ilhan are slimmer this year and if the personality of the candidate put up by the NSP is well-liked, the NSP's chances will go up.

Hr. Necmettin Erbakan kindly agrees that "other parties should be present in a democracy." He says, with this understanding, that the NSP "will be content" with winning 10 senate seats in the upcoming senate election. This kind statement may be looked at as self-denial in the name of democracy, but figures and estimates do not indicate any possibility other than those mentioned. In fact, there are no strong prospects other than in Mardin.

Tomorrow's article will examine the JP.

[13 Aug 79, p 7]

In the first two of the series of articles dealing with the election to fill one-third of the senate seats, which was interrupted because we were required to speak up about the absurd actions taking place at Middle East

Technical University, we scrutinized the chances, which are meager, of the NSP and the NAP and set aside for these parties three senate seats. How will the remaining 47 senate seats be divided among the JP and the RPP? Let us answer this question from the viewpoint of the JP.

JP general headquarters, in an announcement to the press several days ago, reported that it will win 32 senate seats in the 14 October election. According to what is understood from various articles published subsequently, the JP's calculations are based on the belief that there will be a great change in voting patterns in Turkey. The JP is sure that RPP supporters are, at the least, disgruntled and, for this reason, will not go to the polls. This is a possibility, but we do not believe that it is very likely.

We think that it will be more correct to determine the JP's election chances by examining the most recent election data on hand, the numbers and distribution percentages of votes cast for the parties in the 1977 deputy election. Using these yardsticks, the JP's victories by provinces could be as follows:

One senate seat in each of the provinces of Agri, Antalya, Artvin, Bitlis, Burdur, Canakkale, Hatay, Isparta, Kars, Manisa, Rize, Tokat, and Yozgat. Two senate seats in each of the provinces of Balikesir, Erzurum, Kutahya, and Samsun. Three senate seats in Istanbul province. This makes a total of 24.

However, it is not easy to say that there will be no change at all in the 1977 vote distribution. All that has happened since that date, the hopes that were extinguished, and the dreams that have faded because of factors such as anarchy and the high cost of living spell definite changes among unattached voters in particular. But, in fact, there will have to be a very great change in voting patterns in order for there to be a change in the distribution of senate seats. According to general opinion, such a change has taken place in Istanbul. It is possible that the same is also true in Erzurum. In the meantime, in Amasya province, in which the NSP and the NAP have 10,000 votes apiece, the JP's propaganda to "unite against the RPP" can possibly succeed. If these changes are real, we must add three senate seats to our predictions for the JP. Therefore, the JP would have 27 seats. In other words, it could expect to gain nine seats.

It can be seen that, of these nine seats, one would come from the NAP: two, from the NSP; and six, from the RPP.

What would happen if the outcome of the election to fill one-third of the senate seats turns out to be as we have predicted or as the JP has announced? First of all, the JP could, after 2 years, become, once again, the largest party group within the senate. In that case, a JP member would be able to take the seat of chairman in accordance with the "gentlemen's agreement" that has been in effect since 1961 and that foresees the selection of a member of the largest party group as chairman of the senate.

Even if there were no National Assembly by-election on 14 October, a result equaling our estimate or exceeding it would closely affect the continuation of the present government. Such a result would once again intensify the fight for power within the RPP, and, in the meantime, deputies that do not deem themselves powerful enough would be thrown into panic. Because, in such an environment, the JP and other opposition parties would act with more sensitivity in evaluating government mistakes, they would immediately put into action control mechanisms such as general questioning of ministers in parliament. It is very difficult for a government to remain standing in such a case.

When evaluating the election of a third of the senate, we must not forget that the election of the president of Turkey is on the agenda for the spring. The number of members political parties -- the RPP and the JP -- have in the Turkish Grand National Assembly will have a great effect on this election. It is certain that this factor bears an important place in the JP's election tactics. The JP knows that the number of members it will have following the election will not be sufficient to produce the outcome to the presidential election that it wishes, and it is relying on the support of the NSP and the NAP.

[14 Aug 79, p 7]

[Text] After predicting that three senate seats will go to the NSP and the NAP and 27 to the JP, it can be said that the RPP will win 20 seats.

However, it must be remembered that independent candidates in the east and southeast in particular are able to take away a large number of votes from parties. In addition, there is also the fact that, as a person, Ferit Hemen from Van province is stronger than any party or independent. Setting aside two or three seats for this possibility, we leave 17 or 18 seats for the RPP.

Such a result would mean that the RPP and the JP groups would change places in the senate. The RPP has, at present, 75 senators. Of these, 24 terms are about to expire. If the RPP wins 17 or 18 senate seats, the RPP would then have 68 or 69 members. In contrast, the JP group, which consists of 63 members at present, has 18 senators whose terms are ending. If the JP earns 27 seats as we predict, the JP group would have 72 members.

The provinces and probable number of seats we believe the RPP will secure, based on 1977 deputy general election figures, are:

One senate seat from each of the provinces of Antalya, Balikesir, Canakkale, Erzincan, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, and Tokat. Two senate seats from each of the provinces of Kars and Samsun. Five or six seats from Istanbul province. This makes a total of 17 or 18. If the rightist votes of Amasya and Erzurum do not unite to the degree expected by the JP, two senate seats in these provinces could be added to the RPP.

If such a result from the election of one-third of the senate members materializes, the internal party battle, as we pointed out in yesterday's column, will intensify. This is because groups that oppose the party administration will attempt to attribute losses to the administration and, in turn, will seek to occupy the administration positions themselves.

In the meantime, there is a very strong possibility that some RPP group members, finding that their prospects for reelection are slim and wishing to take their chances once again on the ballot, may panic. Suggestions from the JP to those whose morale is low to change party affiliations and guarantees that they will be elected could be very effective. This would make it much more difficult for the RPP government to remain in office following the election. (Here, it must not be forgotten that a by-election will be held 14 October for five deputies' seats and that the JP is expected to win four of the seats.)

There would, of course, be no problem if these predictions did not come true and if, as RPP general headquarters claims, the number of RPP votes increases in rural areas in particular. However, developments indicate that the degree of validity of this claim is very low.

At the same time, there is also the possibility that the election will result in the RPP and JP groups being equal in size. If this happens, the election to be held 1 November to select the chairman of the senate will create a very serious problem. It would be extremely difficult to unite all the members of the RPP behind one candidate -- to ensure that everyone gives his vote to current Chairman Atalay, for example. The support received from the National Unity group and from other senators that do not belong to any party would not be sufficient to make an RPP member the chairman. It is only natural that, if the two groups are of equal size, the JP would have the same problem.

In summary, the senate election, which is not, in fact, related to the formation of the government, has gained great significance because of the environment that exists in the nation and because of the fragile balance that exists in the National Assembly. The outcome of this election will deeply affect the present and future state of the nation.

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